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From the "Introduction"

Space is at a premium. Not only have geographers re-taken the spatial turn, but some historians have too.¹ In the case of historians, the predominant direction has been towards the representation of space, cultural and symbolic geography and topographies.² Those approaches have not, however, only been constituted around post-structural epistemology. Although discursive representations have been predicated, the debt to Foucauldian influence has not always been acknowledged.³ Some will be disappointed that what follows in this book does not adopt one consistent approach to space and place. It

attempts to adopt from the various discussions what resonates in particular situations. Its only consistency is to regard space and place as situational—perhaps even contingent. The intention is not to assert some sort of Derridean *différence*—some deferral of meaning—but to contend that no single position will explain what happens in space and place at all times.

An attempt is made in this introduction to separate out various categories, although this is an artificial and entirely heuristic exercise: representation and reality/practice; structure, “structuration”, and agency; gender; “sacred” and “profane”; public and private; emotions and space; and (em)placed and displaced.⁴ The purpose is to give some guidance to readers who wish to have some indication of recent research into spatial matters. Those who are already well-versed in the literature and contentions might more profitably move on quickly to the following chapters.

Although what follows concentrates on the matter of space, the attempt is made not to fall into “spatial fetishism”, or reifying space and investing it with its own agency, a point to which we will return at the end of this introduction.⁵

The second aspect of this book is place. Although they are different categories of analysis, space and place are not totally divorced from each other. Place has also been increasingly of interest to historians and sociologists. From one angle, that renewal of investigation has been generated through post-structural critique of globalization, particularly inspired by Lyotard, but place has always had an intrinsic interest as the *locus* of events and social relations.⁶ The current preoccupation with “belonging” and “identity” accounts for the investigation of place. Place is one aspect (although only one) of belonging and identity, and for some (but not all), relatedly, of sites of memory (*lieux de mémoire*).⁷ In this epistemology of belonging, a sense of place is of paramount importance. It is the special features of a place— the *genius loci*—which engender part

(but only part) of the sense of belonging and place-identity. The concealed genealogy then is to phenomenology, the existence and movement of the body in space and place.⁸ Here, however, the concern is as much with being out of place, placeless, and not integrated into place as being (em)placed. The contention—not new, but sometimes ignored—is that for the *longue durée* under consideration here most people were in motion, or, to adopt Patricia Fumerton’s felicitous phrase, “unsettled”.⁹ Wider verification of this concern with the “rootless” may be elicited: “that the emphasis they gave to the rooted over the unrooted or the uprooted, to the in-place over the out-of-place, was at best problematical and perhaps ‘inauthentic’”.¹⁰

Some of these categories might look binary oppositions, but that differentiation is not privileged here, for a few reasons. Attitudes towards and involvement in place and space are not so consistent; fuzziness is another category; and all the categories enumerated above interact and react upon each other. Separating them out as is done below, is an artificial, heuristic process, removed from the complexity of real life. In examining in this way the various categories below, there are two objectives. The first is simply to recapitulate and rehearse the different approaches that have been taken in previous literature. Doing so acquits the obligation of an introduction by establishing contexts and a state of play. On the other hand, the exposition is merely that: a brief survey. It does not have particular depth and is no substitute for the works cited. Within the space available, it cannot respect the complexity of the original theses and, in any case, it would be beyond the simple capability of this author.¹¹ The second intention is to indicate how the individual chapters below can be located within these frameworks.

Since the chapters together do not address all the categories evenly or equally, some themes receive more attention in the introduction, and others are explicated more cursorily. It will be self-evident that recent geographical literature has elucidated expansively the different

approaches. It would be impossible for this author to revisit in the same depth or with the same erudition the way in which geographers have recently visited the questions surrounding place and space. References to this literature will be found in the chapters below.¹²

There now follows brief discussions of the salient aspects of space. It must be reiterated again that the categories are separated out for heuristic purposes only. Life as it is lived is much more complex than this categorization allows.

“Structured space” and “representation”

Historians’ perceptions of how spaces were represented owe as much to structuralism, to, for example, Mary Douglas’s binaries of purity and danger, inside and outside. That conceptualization has, moreover, influenced the cultural geography depicted by some geographers, such as David Sibley.¹³ The result is the formulation of notions about spaces being homologous and in binary divisions, with an intermediate and external “liminality”, and ideas that incursions from one space to another are impure, that is, transgressive. These penetrations are thus analogous with Douglas’s conclusion that orifices in the body allow the intrusion of impurities and danger. The principal problem of the representation of space is that it privileges one perception of that space, which is mostly the perspective of the elite. For representations of space are normally imposed by elites, those with “power” to pronounce the “closed” (that is, unitary) nature of the space.¹⁴ So representation of space in fact involves a politics of space, in which the symbolism is hegemonic.¹⁵ Another general problem is that not all penetrations elicit the disgust associated with pollution.¹⁶

Critical geographers (and, indeed, critical social theorists), particularly David Harvey, on the other hand, taking into account

hegemony and materialism, have been more reluctant to accept representations *qua* representations only.¹⁷ This cultural materialism still respects the structures of space. Another approach has emphasized the enduring features of space through time: persistence of spatial structures.¹⁸ This structuralist argument owes something to the *Annales* School with its privileging of deep structures. Some, like Lefebvre, have endeavored to emphasize how spaces are socially produced, and this epistemology is not necessarily antithetical to structural geography.¹⁹

“Agency” and space

Yet a further strand of geographers has addressed the “structuration” theories of Bourdieu and Giddens, to understand how structure and agency interact. In Allan Pred’s case, the emphasis is on the inter-action between individual and structure, that is, the agenda established by Giddens, illustrating how recursive and repetitive actions by individuals establish and confirm structures. Bourdieu, by contrast, began with the influence of “class” and how that relates to structure, producing ideas of the *habitus*. The relationship between structure, agency, and structuration is deliberated in many chapters below, but especially 1, 6-8, and the CONCLUSION.

Two other writers have, in contrast, associated space with contingency, de Certeau and Benjamin, but with different contexts in mind. Walter Benjamin conceived of the middle-class *flâneur* who distractedly meandered the streets and spaces of the city. Such a deliberate itinerary belonged to the privileged, whose loitering would not arouse suspicion.²⁰ Although owing some debt to Benjamin, de Certeau considered meandering in a different context, if in the same space. Unconscious random weaving about the urban space could be engaged in by all and sundry, and in so doing these urban ramblers

inadvertently subverted the meanings associated with spaces. There is much that is attractive in de Certeau's idea. Whilst it is an action, the meandering is purposeless, unconscious and unselfconscious, but in its process traduces spatial proprieties. The spatial is then also psychoanalytical. What it neglects, however, is the surveillance of space, especially urban space, whether formal or informal, official or unofficial, publicly-exerted or personally-imposed and self-disciplined. Conscious and unconscious monitoring of people moving in spaces elicits suspicion and marginalization.²¹

What is left? We have a plethora of conceptualizations of what constitutes and forms space. We have equally, then, a plurality of social and cultural geographies of space. Indeed, we have not reverted to a Cartesian or a Kantian notion of space as merely metrical or a container. We can perceive that space is never neutral, but we do not agree on what informs the rhetoric of spaces. Perhaps we can move forward by recognizing that space is where humans act and have their being and existence, so that not everyone in the same space will entertain the same perceptions of the space. Space, as a particular entity, therefore becomes fragmented and it may not, indeed, be appropriate to refer to space in the singular since every "space" consists of multiple "spacialities". The CONCLUSION explores these possibilities in the context of interactions within the space of the market place in early-modern England. So space may be contingent on the actor. It may, moreover, be that the nature of the space is transient as the actor('s body) moves through and out of it. It is with this residual concept that spaces are complex, heterogeneous, fragmented, even contingent, that the rest of this small book follows: a "collective" phenomenology of spaces.²²

Before moving on, nonetheless, it may be productive to rehearse how contemporaries in the past represented their spaces, in this restricted sense: What rhetoric did they use and what adjectives did they propose about their spaces?²³ What complicates this issue is that the

persuasive voices that we hear are only those of authority, those with the power to represent spaces as unitary in meaning and purpose. We shall see later how their representations were contradicted by actions in those spaces by non-elite people who had no authority but had the capacity to subvert the representation of the space.

“Sacred space”

On Sunday morning, December 6, 1601, Mr. Arthur Greene read the first lesson in the chancel of his parish church. Greene interrupted divine service that morning and in the chancel “did thear pluck out violently” Robert Lightfoote because Greene had admonished all the congregation not to sit in the chancel because he had reserved it for his own male and female servants “because they could not be permitted to sitt in the body of the Church ...”, by which we must assume that he would not allow them so to do.²⁴

This episode brings into relief a number of issues: the representation of the social hierarchy in church through the segregation of the congregation; the potential for zoning of space; observation of “sacred” space; and whether, if the notion of “sacred” space obtained, it had been subverted by the religious transformations of sixteenth-century England.²⁵

Whilst the concept of “sacred” and “profane” spaces is examined in more detail below in chapters 6-8, the opportunity is taken here to address the issues, since they have become once again integral to much historical thinking.²⁶ We shall also return to the notion below (EMOTIONS AND SPACE) with reference to Rudolf Otto. The conceptualization has, of course, a long genealogy in sociological epistemology. From Durkheim onwards, there has been a tendency to proclaim the difference between “sacred” and “profane” space, although at the core of Durkheim’s

thought was that society (as “community”) was sacred rather than its religion and its religious spaces, which were merely manifestations of the divine nature of society and community. Notwithstanding that, Mircea Eliade proclaimed the primeval distinction of sacred and profane space. Let me immediately indicate the position taken here: any differentiation into “sacred” and “profane” inherently makes ontological assumptions—that people *always* and *without exception* map the world into binary distinctions. That belief is not uncontested.²⁷

Most frequently, we are privileged with the *dicta* of ecclesiastical authorities, quite often referring to their “spiritual” space. In 1420 and several times again shortly thereafter, Edmund Lacy, bishop of Exeter, could refer to spiritual space as “honest place”. In authorizing the celebration of divine service (the mass) in a private oratory or chapel for William Monke, esquire, the bishop ordained a chapel, oratory or any other honest place appropriate for divine service (“aut alio loco honesto cultui divino disposito”). He repeated this phrase (“locis honestis cultui divino dispositis”) when making allowances for the mass within the city of Exeter.²⁸ Here, the intention behind “honest” seems to have been suitable or appropriate to the dignity of the occasion. Notions of the distinction between the “holy” and “sacred” as against the “profane” and “secular” are continued below in the section on EMOTIONS AND SPACE since the division depends on an *a priori* ontology which is influenced by a sentient and emotional response. In chapters 6-8, ideas of this binary differentiation of space are confronted.²⁹

In fact, the question of “sacred” space has been examined in some detail in recent studies of church space. Chapter 8 below addresses the issue in the context of the church porch: a microspace. In this introduction, then, there is no great need to re-examine the problem in great detail.

We can, however, place these issues into a comparative context: punishment and penance invoked by the unitary courts in British

colonial North America. Instead of a plurality of courts, the colonists instituted single courts with comprehensive competence, so there was no division between cases in secular courts and causes in ecclesiastical courts. These unitary courts imposed sentences which involved action in both secular and ecclesiastical spaces. When in 1638 Deborah Glasscocke wife of Robert, of New Norfolk, carpenter, scandalized Captain Sibsey that his maid had a child by him, Deborah was condemned to receive a hundred stripes on her shoulders and to solicit Sibsey's forgiveness now in court and on the next Sabbath in the parish church at the time of divine service.³⁰

So two years later, the same court decided that Saville Gaskin and his wife Anne, having uttered allegations of childbirth against Anne, wife of Richard Foster, should receive respectively twenty and ten lashes on their bare backs; but after their supplication, the sentence was converted to their begging forgiveness in open court and next Sabbath before the congregation when the minister preached after the first lesson in the morning, reciting after the minister such words as he required them.³¹ From these examples we can perceive how the court, technically a local administrative and "criminal" jurisdiction, employed different types of space provided those spaces involved the most public (open) example and humiliation. The court met monthly in one of the houses, entertaining all types of offense: commercial, civil, moral and some criminal. Sometimes, the punishments were regarded hierarchically; when a person defaulted, a higher correction was substituted. Anne Gaskine, condemned for defamation and slanderous speeches against Richard Forster's wife, escaped rather lightly with the sentence to perform penance in the parish church of Linhaven; on her refusal, she was arrested by the sheriff and delivered to the house of Captain Thomas Willoughby to receive twenty lashes on bare back, followed by her performing penance at the parish church on Sunday. If she refused again, she would be subjected to increments of whipping

(thirty/forty/fifty) for each delict on each successive Monday.³² The resistance by Eady Tolker for fornication resulted in the same escalation on her failure to enjoin her penance in the chapel of ease more demonstratively by ignoring the minister, cutting up her sheet and defacing it; for this outrage she was condemned to twenty lashes on her back, and penance was enjoined again (1641).³³ In cases of defamation (“scandalizing”), the court often demanded that the guilty party ask forgiveness in the face of the court, but as often in the parish church, or in both fora. In 1638 Richard Low, planter, “scandalized” Anne Batkings, wife of Wm, to the great “impeaching” of her name and credit; Low was informed that he must ask her forgiveness on the next Sabbath at the parish church of Lower Norfolk County.³⁴ Like Deborah Glasscocke above, Anne Fowler, wife of William, of Linhaven, planter, in 1637 engaged in insubordinate and abusive language against officialdom, for which she was sentenced to twenty stripes upon her bare shoulders, but also to ask forgiveness of Captain Thorowgood now in court and on the ensuing Sunday at Linhaven (parish church).³⁵

In the instances of fornication, the unitary court resorted to ecclesiastical space for penance. When the churchwardens of Linhaven parish presented a couple for fornication, they were enjoined to do penance in the parish church on the following Sunday when the minister preached, standing in the middle aisle on a stool in a white sheet and a white wand in their hands all the time of divine service and to recite such words before the congregation as the minister asks them.³⁶ No doubt this stipulation in the British new world was designed to follow the practice familiar in the old country. On the other hand, these judicial punishments also demonstrate adjustment in the use of space in different circumstances, by a unitary court not a divided judicial organization.

The court of assistants of New Hampshire operated in a similar fashion, opting for the use of both spaces. George Burdet, minister of Agamenticus, indicted for ill fame and incontinence, which was

constituted by dangerous talk and seduction of women (one got with child), received two fines twenty pounds; but the pregnant woman was condemned to stand, six weeks after delivery of her child, in a white sheet publicly in the congregation at Agamenticus on two Sundays and one day in General Court in 1640.³⁷

What we also notice in Virginia is the absence of punishment in the market place—another adaptation to the use of space for judicial purposes. The different settlement topography of the Bay area, by contrast, allowed the perpetuation of the market place for judicial punishment. The Quarterly Courts of the Bay Company retained this option. For his drunkenness then (a frequently adjudicated offense here) James Brown was sentenced to stand publicly in 1637 for two hours in the bilbows on the market day at Boston.³⁸ The husband of Eleanor Pierce, for his wife's light behavior, in 1639 was bound over in ten pounds to bring her to stand in the market place on market day with a paper explaining her offense.³⁹ To recite one more example, Thomas Scott and his wife, because of their pre-marital sexual relationship, had to stand one hour in the market place with a paper with great letters in their hats.⁴⁰ The market place at Boston thus permitted the continuation of the humiliation of offenders in that public space.

Even in this colonial society, there was an adjustment in the (time) and space for performance of punishment.⁴¹ The unitary court employed the market place, but also resorted to ecclesiastical (time and) space. For her offense, Francis Weston's wife was enjoined to stand for two hours in the bilbows in Cambridge and two hours at Salem, not on a market day, but on a lecture day.⁴² For indulging in pre-marital fornication, Henry Leake and his wife were to appear at the next lecture day at Dorchester and acknowledge their fault after the lecture (1643).⁴³ Drunkenness in one case in 1639 was admonished by the male standing at the meeting house door on the next lecture day with a cleft stick on his tongue and paper on his hat for gross lying, additional to a fine of 40s.⁴⁴ Commission

of a burglary in the following year resulted in whipping on a lecture day and to be set an hour before the lecture with a paper on the culprit's head.⁴⁵ Numerous transgressions in these years engendered punishment on lecture days: for abduction of a servant, whipping on a lecture day or before the town meeting; for scurrilous speeches and tippling, standing in the meeting house with a paper on the head for a false accuser; for reproachful and unseemly speeches against the rule of the church, sitting in the stocks for an hour and severe whipping on the next lecture day; for cursing his master, severe whipping at the lecture day or town meeting; a pregnant woman for pilfering, sitting in the stocks on next lecture day for one hour; Eunice Cole for slanderous speeches in breach of her binding over, sitting half an hour on the next lecture day and (there?) making public acknowledgment of her slanderous speeches (1645).⁴⁶

We can then agree with William Offutt, that a certain amount of "legal capital" was imported, an accumulated legal knowledge from the old country, and that such capital was employed, nonetheless, only in conjunction with a "legal imagination" which involved an intellectual ability to produce new forms, unitary courts, and further, as we have illustrated here (but which is not suggested by Offutt) to make similar accommodation in the deployment of judicial space.⁴⁷

One of the problems of church space, finally, was a difficulty of all open space: any open space was likely to be appropriated for secular purposes. So, no doubt because of their constant experience, the assembly of Yarmouth had to introduce a fine of 5s. for anyone shooting a bow and arrows in the church or churchyard.⁴⁸

Gender and space

It was within churches that a division of space by gender conventionally occurred. Historians have remarked upon this frequent distinction, which was no doubt facilitated by the introduction of seating.⁴⁹ In some instances, the separation by gender also had hierarchical motivation. In Yarmouth in 1582, the wives of the twenty-four were placed in the chapel where the bailiffs' wives sat, enabled by the removal of all other women who customarily sat there. The husband of any woman who refused to leave was subject to a fine of 5s. Henceforth it became the chapel exclusively for the wives of the twenty-four.⁵⁰

Attempts to decipher separate spaces inhabited by men and women on a quotidian basis in medieval England are not free from ambiguity.⁵¹ Women might have refrained from frequenting inns except for the publicity afforded there to betrothal arrangements.⁵² In some urban places, women's markets might have been provided at which women traded in those commodities symbolically associated with their gender: dairy produce and small livestock, especially fowl.⁵³ Rigid delineation of space by gender was not, however, sustainable.⁵⁴ There were, nonetheless, particular spaces and places that women habitually frequented or spaces which on special occasions were reserved to women.⁵⁵

C. CUSTANCE Good wenches would not so rampe abroad
ydelly, But keepe within doores, and plie their worke earnestly;⁵⁶

Chapter 10, however, is concerned with some women who were displaced and were, in some senses, place-less. Poor, single, pregnant women were compelled to uproot precipitately. Some locations provided temporary refuge, such as West Ham for women from the metropolitan area and Lenton for poor women from Nottingham, but always illicitly and with the prospect of detection.⁵⁷

“Public” and “private” space

In the ecclesiastical courts, a notion of “public space” was enunciated. In, for example, an office cause of April 4, 1579, in the consistory court of Ely, the sentence demanded that the man and woman—accused of evil conversation—do not encounter each other “except in foro publico mercates [sic] Ecclesia, et aliis locis publicis”, thus defining market place and church as the principal public places.⁵⁸ The understanding of “public space” therefore depended on social visibility, as opposed to hidden from social view. Further definition is found in the consistory court of Canterbury in 1562, in which the couple were admonished in future only to meet in the church or market place; if the woman and man should both happen to be in the same house, the woman must leave.⁵⁹ We find the same expressions employed in the consistory court of Durham, where, in 1453 and 1455, men and women were ordered to refrain [from meeting] in “suspicious” places.⁶⁰ In 1535, the court ordered that another couple meet only in “public places”.⁶¹ Bishop Barnes followed his predecessors’ example in 1579 in prohibiting fornicating couples to come into contact except in the church and market place.⁶²

In contrast to “*loca publica*” were opposed “*loca suspecta*”: that is, places which lacked social visibility were categorized as “suspicious” places, hidden from view, where nefarious activities might secretly occur. In the consistory court of bishop Arundel in 1377, then, Joan Seustere renounced her sin (“*abiuravit peccam*”) and “suspicious places” (“*loca suspecta*”) on pain of flogging on six days round the market and church.⁶³ Denouncing an adulterous liaison in the early seventeenth century, the archdeaconry court of Nottingham located the sin as having taken place “*in loco secreto*”, even though it was committed in the village of North Wheatley, a far from substantial place.⁶⁴ What is intended by the adjective “public”, then, is “open” and visible, where

people's actions were automatically under general surveillance and monitored, where people were prevented, by the openness, from engaging in prohibited relationships and illicit communication. By allowing people to meet only in "public" places and spaces, it was ensured that their relationships and communications were overseen in the natural course. Any location which was not so perceptible, constituted a suspicious place or was secret in the sense of occluded. Public, suspect and secret were thus associated with the capacity to monitor social relationships between people whose communication with each other should be limited to what was acceptable.

In quotidian affairs, the distinction between public and private spaces was ambiguous and ill-formed. It is generally accepted that, especially in urban places, the distinction and boundary between public and private could not be consistently maintained amongst most social groups.⁶⁵ The "offense" of eavesdropping persisted. The report of common fame quickly dispersed more widely communications made immediately between individuals.⁶⁶ So in *Linaker v. Jackson* in defamation in 1582 the complaint was expressed: "Fie upon the thou blacke mouthed Jade, comest thou into my owne house to call me hore."⁶⁷ Words exchanged inside the home extended outside to affect honor and reputation—or so it was feared. We might summarize the situation that some places were more overtly public and open—and regarded and represented as such (as above)—whilst other places, whilst superficially more intimate, secret and concealed, might not be so easily demarcated and separated.⁶⁸

Contention brings into relief notions of privacy, property and propriety and emotional eruptions were seminal to this process. In 1621, Catherine Wrighte, maid to the wife of Thomas Greaves of Coddington, impealed Robert Otterbie in a cause of defamation in the archdeaconry court of Nottingham.⁶⁹ At issue was Otterbie's reaction to Catherine using his backyard as a shortcut, he reportedly exclaimed:

I can keepe nothing in my yarde for her ... shee comes like an amblinge whore and your fence is downe, you thincke to do as you did the laste yeere, you keepe a trippinge whore I can never keepe her out of my yarde as well as you keepe a trippinge whore to your maide the fence is broken downe, I can have no profit of my yard for you

Ignoring the proprieties of public view, it was alleged that one Beever "hath had bodily dealing with Elizabeth Wade of Missen in the towne streete, and occupied her against the wall..." The words led to a defamation cause in the ecclesiastical court, so it is uncertain whether the deed was actually perpetrated, but it was not unimaginable.⁷⁰

Binary divisions into sacred and profane, public and private, and so on, require some effort in the maintenance of boundaries. Historians, concerned with the diachronic and temporal, can elucidate how boundaries change and fluctuate over time. Especially is that the case with any distinction between public and private. Some might indeed argue that the perception of such a boundary is an aspect of modernity. Others might contend that even now the boundaries are not firmly established. Boundaries might not only *not* be fixed then, but might be matters of perception, visible only to the eye of the beholder or differently observed.

Notes

¹It must be admitted from the outset that this book does not really address geographers' metrological models of space and place. In some of the chapters, some models are identified, but this introduction will not dwell on them. A fine introduction is Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman, and Anthony J. Venables, *The Spatial Economy. Cities, Regions, and International Trade* (Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press, 1999). The spatial turn by geographers is illustrated by the journal *Society and Space*. In this introduction, the literature about space and place will be recited sparingly. More substantial references will be found in each of the following chapters.

²The geographical literature is reviewed in detail throughout and in the CONCLUSION below. For a succinct examination of the various positions, Peet, *Modern Geographical Thought*, 98-108, 119-29, 158-60, 170-2, 274. See also the formative David Gregory and John Urry, eds., *Social Relations and Spatial Structures* (London: Macmillan, 1985). For more detailed considerations, Nigel Thrift, *Spatial Formations* (London: Sage, 1996). The representational (cultural) strand is perhaps epitomized by Denis Cosgrove and Steven Daniels, eds., *The Iconography of Landscape. Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For an historical geographer's examination of the representation of medieval urban space, Keith D. Lilley, "Mapping Cosmopolis: Moral Topographies of the Medieval City," *Society and Space* 22 (2004): 681-98.

³Barbara A. Hanawalt and Michael Kobialka, eds., *Medieval Practices of Space, Medieval Cultures* vol. 23 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) shows how representation and the reality of space are irreducibly interconnected. A helpful reflection on the interconnectedness is Rob Shields, *Places on the Margin. Alternative Geographies of Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1991).

⁴For the background to structuration theories, John Parker, *Structuration* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), which explains the divergent structuration ideas of Giddens and Bourdieu, predicated through their different emphases on individual agency and class as formative of structuration.

⁵Chris Collinge, "The *Différence* Between Society and Space: Nested Scales and the Return of Spatial Fetishism," *Society and Space* 23 (2005): 189-206.

⁶Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

⁷Even, more diffusely, in the everyday sites of activity: Michael Hebbert, "The Street as a Locus of Collective Memory," *Society and Space* 23 (2005): 581-96.

⁸For these hidden genealogies, Peet, *Modern Geographical Thought*, passim, but also succinctly Steven Field and Keith H. Basso, eds., *Senses of Place* (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1996), 3-4.

⁹Patricia Fumerton, *Unsettled. The Culture of Mobility and the Working Poor in Early Modern England* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006). The point is elaborated below.

¹⁰Cited by Field and Basso, *Senses of Place*, 4.

¹¹The introduction to Field and Basso, *Senses of Place*, although succinct, has wonderful nuance.

¹²Special mention is made here of Peet, *Modern Geographical Thought*, as a lucid introduction to all these issues, including the resurgence of phenomenology—the experience of the lived body in space; Claval, *Regional Geography*; Mike Crang, *Cultural Geography* (London: Routledge, 1998) (e.g. p. 2: “cultures are spread over space ... cultures make sense of space”).

¹³Sibley, *Geographies of Exclusion*: so his constant reference, even in titles of chapters, to “border crossings”, “mapping the pure and defiled”, “bounding space: purification and control”.

¹⁴For a complication of this argument, Lorraine Young, “The ‘Place’ of Street Children in Kampala, Uganda: Marginalisation, Resistance, and Acceptance of the Urban Environment,” *Society and Space* 21 (2003): 607-27.

¹⁵This proposition is beautifully encapsulated in Rhonda L. Sanford, *Maps and Memory in Modern England. A Sense of Place* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).

¹⁶This point is well made by Bill Miller: “Douglas needs more than just the notion of not fitting, because only certain kinds of not fitting are upsetting”: William Ian Miller, *The Anatomy of Disgust* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 267, n. 12. See also his critique of Douglas’s “cold structure” at 271, n. 4.

¹⁷David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (London: Edward Arnold, 1973) and *Consciousness and the Urban Experience* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985): cultural materialism.

¹⁸Dodgshon, *Society in Time and Space*.

¹⁹Lefebvre, *Production of Space*.

²⁰For Benjamin’s life and thought, Esther Leslie, *Walter Benjamin. Overpowering Conformism* (London: Pluto Press, 2000) (for this present context, 183-92); Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* trans. Steven Rendall

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 91-110, 115-30; for commentary, Ian Buchanan, *Michel de Certeau. Cultural Theorist* (London: Sage, 2000), 108-25; Jeremy Ahearne, *Michel de Certeau. Interpretation and its Other* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 177-8.

²¹De Certeau thus inherits, but questions, the Foucauldian legacy of surveillance and self-disciplinary techniques. Foucault's symbolic order is also, of course, significant for the representation of space, although not realized in some historical writing about the representation of space.

²²That term is awkward, of course; for one way of reconciling individual phenomenology and collective experience, Paul Harrison, "Making Sense: Embodiment and Sensibilities of the Everyday," *Society and Space* 18 (2000): 497-517, which adapts Williams's "structures of feeling" as the "sensate" which enables the transformation to collective experience and defining personal experience as emergent and "elusory", unperfected process which contributes to wider sentiment.

²³See in general Lawrence J. Prelli, ed., *Rhetorics of Display* (Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2006).

²⁴ROLLR 1D41/13/24, fol. 26r..

²⁵C. John Sommerville, *The Secularization of Early Modern England. From Religious Culture to Religious Faith* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 18-32: yet Sommerville himself asks whether this was not more a sacralization of church space than a secularization (p. 30). See now, Christian Grosse, "Places of Sanctification: The Liturgical Sacrality of Genevan Reformed Churches, 1535-1566," and John Craig, "Psalms, Groans and Dogwhippers: The Soundscape of Worship in the English Parish Church, 1547-1642," both in *Sacred Space* ed. Coster and Spicer, 60-80, 104-23; Andrew Pettegree, *Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10-75.

²⁶It pervades most medieval historical writing, although often without reference to its genealogy. More substantively, it has recently been re-examined in early-modern contexts. Coster and Spicer, *Sacred Space*. See also Christopher Marsh, "Sacred Space in England, 1560-1640: The View from the Pew," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 53 (2002): 286-311.

²⁷For brevity, see Michael Pickering, *Stereotyping. The Politics of Representation* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 29; Eviatar Zerubavel, *Social Mindscapes. An*

Invitation to Cognitive Sociology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 30-31, 59-63.

²⁸Gordon R. Dunstan, ed., *The Register of Edmund Lacy Bishop of Exeter, 1420-1455. Registrum Commune*, vol. 1, Devon and Cornwall Record Society n.s. 7 (Exeter, 1963), 8, 73, 87, 176.

²⁹A structurational (rather than structuralist) consideration, derived from both Bourdieu and Giddens, is contained in C. P. Graves, "Social Space in the English Medieval Parish Church," *Economy and Society* 18 (1989): 297-322. Parker, *Structuration* for a sociological discussion; for the geographical perspective, Peet, *Modern Geographical Thought*, 153-62.

³⁰Alice Granbery Walter, ed., *Lower Norfolk County, Virginia, Court Records. Book "A" 1637-1646 & Book "B" 1646-1651/2* (Baltimore: Cleanfield Company Inc., 1994), 8.

³¹Walter, ed., *Lower Norfolk County, Virginia, Court Records*, 57.

³²Walter, ed., *Lower Norfolk County, Virginia, Court Records*, 82.

³³Walter, ed., *Lower Norfolk County, Virginia, Court Records*, 71.

³⁴Walter, ed., *Lower Norfolk County, Virginia, Court Records*, 8.

³⁵Walter, ed., *Lower Norfolk County, Virginia, Court Records*, 1-2.

³⁶Walter, ed., *Lower Norfolk County, Virginia, Court Records*, 58, 65.

³⁷Nathaniel Bouton, ed., *Provincial Papers: Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire* (Concord: State Printer, 1867), 121.

³⁸Massachusetts State Archives Massachusetts Quarterly Courts microfilm, p. 68 (paginated not foliated). For the problem of drunkenness, Sharon V. Salinger, *Taverns and Drinking in Early America* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 83-120

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 89 (paginated not foliated). (See also the two other contemporary cases: pp. 89-90).

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 124 (paginated not foliated).

⁴¹For the background, David T. Konig, *Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts: Essex County, 1629-1692* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1979)

⁴²As n. 38 above, p. 75 (paginated not foliated).

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 131 (paginated not foliated).

⁴⁴*Record and Files of the Quarterly Courts of Essex County Massachusetts vol. I, 1636-1656* (Salem Mass.: Essex Institute, 1911), 15.

⁴⁵*Record and Files of the Quarterly Courts of Essex*, 18.

⁴⁶*Record and Files of the Quarterly Courts of Essex*, 33, 34, 36, 49, 51.

⁴⁷William M. Offutt, "The Atlantic Rules. The Legalistic Turn in Colonial British America," in *The Creation of the British Atlantic World* ed. Elizabeth Mancke and Carole Shammas (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University, 2005), 160-81

⁴⁸NNRO Y/C19/4, fol. 48v.

⁴⁹We await Amanda Flather, *Gender and Space in Early Modern England* (Woodbridge: Boydell for the Royal Historical Society, 2007).

⁵⁰NNRO Y/C19/4, fols. 57v, 189v, 201v.

⁵¹P. Jeremy P. Goldberg, "The Public and the Private: Women in the Pre-Plague Economy," in *Thirteenth Century England III* ed. Peter R. Coss and Simon D. Lloyd (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1991), 75-89.

⁵²Shannon McSheffrey, *Marriage, Sex, and Civic Culture in Late Medieval London* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 128-34.

⁵³Michael Roberts, "Women and Work in Sixteenth-century English Towns," in *Work in Towns 850-1850*, ed. Penelope Corfield and Derek Keene (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990), 94, 101 (n. 67); Marjorie K. McIntosh, *Working Women in English Society 1300-1620* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 129; P. Jeremy P. Goldberg, *Women, Work, and Life Cycle in a Medieval Economy. Women in York and Yorkshire c.1300-1520* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 104; for the women's market at High Wycombe in 1652, Robert W. Greaves, ed., *The First Ledger Book of High Wycombe*, Buckinghamshire Record Society vol. 11 (1956), 145 (no. 208).

⁵⁴Excellently illustrated by Laura Gowing, "'The Freedom of the Streets': Women and Social Space, 1560-1640," in *Londinopolis. Essays in the Cultural and Social History of Early Modern London*, ed. Paul Griffiths and Mark Jenner (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 130-51, with important bibliographical references at 148.

⁵⁵Gowing, *Common Bodies. Women, Touch and Power in Seventeenth-century England* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 149-76 (before the intrusion of male midwives); Bernard Capp, *When Gossips Meet. Women, Family, and*

Neighbourhood in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49-55. See also Sarah Mendelson and Patricia Crawford, *Women in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 205-12; Corinne S. Abate, ed., *Privacy, Domesticity, and Women in Early Modern England* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). CUL D2/10, fol. 239v: office c. Agnes Haseldon (adultery): “& ys deliuered of a childe by John Dale as she saythe before all the wemen at the tyme of hir travell.”

⁵⁶Nicholas Udall, *Roister Doister* [c.1552-66], Act II, scene iv, lines 775-6.

⁵⁷I owe the information about Lenton to Dr. Linda Lees.

⁵⁸CUL EDR D2/10, fol. 134v.

⁵⁹Arthur J. Willis, ed., *Church Life in Kent being Church Court Records of the Canterbury Diocese 1559-1565* (London and Chichester: Phillimore, 1975), 49 (410). Further examples: only to meet in public places (49 (413); 51 (425); 53 (435); 59 (471)).

⁶⁰James Raine, ed., *Depositions and Other Ecclesiastical Proceedings from the Courts of Durham*, SS vol. 21 (1845), 34, 36 (“quod obstineant a loco suspecto/locis suspectis”).

⁶¹Raine, *Depositions and Other Ecclesiastical Proceedings*, 51 (“nisi solum modo in publicis locis”).

⁶²Raine, ed., *The Injunctions and Other Ecclesiastical Proceedings of Richard Barnes, Bishop of Durham, from 1575 to 1587*, SS vol. 22 (1850), 123.

⁶³CUL EDR D/2/1, fol. lxxxvijr. The phrase was reiterated in another office cause in 1378: “abiuravit peccam et loca suspecta”: D/2/1, fol. lxxxxvijr-v [sic].

⁶⁴UoN Dept. of MSS. AN/LB 222/5/2/1-2.

⁶⁵Shannon McSheffrey, “Place, Space, and Situation: Public and Private in the Making of Marriage in Late-Medieval London,” *Speculum* 79 (2004): 960-90, and now her *Marriage, Sex, and Civic Culture*, 121-63.

⁶⁶A fascinating discussion of the effects of common fame in medieval society is Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail, eds., *Fama: The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); UoN Dept. of MSS. AN/LB 218/2/7/4 *communis vox et fama; publica vox et fama*; “common voice and fame”.

⁶⁷UoN Dept. of MSS. AN/LB 216/2/2/1.

⁶⁸Capp, *When Gossips Meet*, 49-68; the implications of Mark Jenner, "From Conduit Community to Commercial Network? Water in London, 1500-1725," in *Londinopolis*, ed. Griffiths and Jenner, 250-72; Marjorie K. McIntosh, *Controlling Misbehavior in England, 1370-1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 65-9; McSheffrey, *Marriage, Sex, and Civic Culture*, 121-34

⁶⁹UoN Dept. of MSS. AN/LB 224/1/50/1-6.

⁷⁰UoN Dept. of MSS. AN/LB 224/1/8 Beever c. Ridley Libel in defamation, 1621 (Misson).