

# Contents

<i>Preface</i>		ix
Introduction		1
<b>Part I</b>	<b>Ideological Genocides as Holocausts</b>	15
1	The Destruction of the Idolaters	17
2	The Witch-Hunts in Europe	33
3	Genocide in Turkish Armenia	51
4	The Man-Made Famine and Stalin's War on the Enemies of the People	63
5	The Destruction of European Jewry	85
6	Genocide in Cambodia	105
7	Similarities and Differences	119
<b>Part II</b>	<b>Colonialist Genocides as Holocausts</b>	137
8	The Destruction of Native Peoples in Spanish America	139
9	Clearing the Land of the Indian in the Thirteen Colonies and the United States	147
10	European-Native Relations in Canada	169
11	The Fate of Aborigines in Tasmania and on the Australian Mainland	187
12	Patterns of Genocide as the Old World Conquered the New	197
<b>Part III</b>	<b>A Typology of Genocide</b>	205
13	Ideological Genocides and Colonialist Genocides: Similarities and Differences	207
14	The Holocaust within a Typology of Genocide	217
15	Colonialist Genocides within a Typology of Genocide	223
Conclusion		231
Appendix A	Critique of Biblical Historical Record as Presented by Israel Finkelstein and Neil A. Silberman, in <i>The Bible Unearthed</i>	253

Appendix B	The Problem of Numbers: The Soviet German Example	256
Appendix C	Death in the Gulag	258
<i>Notes</i>		261
<i>Bibliography</i>		290
<i>Index</i>		304

## Introduction

Is there a relationship between our belief in God, our pursuit of salvation, and a holocaust—a destruction aiming at the total eradication of a target group? When does greed become so pervasive that it leads us to destroy not merely another person but entire groups? How does defining a group as demonic and contaminating justify its annihilation? How does defining a group as less than human encourage people to despoil and destroy it? These questions particularly beg for answers when one explores whether the term “holocaust” more properly describes a pattern or one particular historical instance of genocide.

The term “holocaust” became fixed in the language of genocide when it was applied to describe the Nazi destruction of European Jewry, with some scholars maintaining the term is applicable only to this case. Thus, Steven Katz argues that the Nazi destruction of European Jewry is “phenomenologically unique,” basing his view on the claim that never prior to this has a state, “as a matter of intent and principle and actualizing policy,” undertaken to destroy every member of a specific group.<sup>1</sup> He therefore sees the term “holocaust” properly applying only to this genocide. A similar argument is put forward by Yehuda Bauer, who uses the term “holocaust” to differentiate between Nazi aims for the Jews and their aims for other nationalities, such as the Czechs, Poles, or Gypsies. Of these groups, only the Jews were to be totally destroyed. He sees the main feature of the holocaust as being the focus on the total destruction of the Jews, this being the first time in history that a sentence of death has been pronounced on anyone guilty of having been born of certain parents, who in this case were Jews.<sup>2</sup> Other researchers have broadened the category somewhat and included under the “holocaust” not only the destruction of European Jewry but also the Nazi destruction of European Gypsies and the Nazi policy on eugenics. At the same time, they consider the holocaust to be the ultimate ideological genocide.<sup>3</sup> However, generally researchers who focus on the holocaust as a unique event apply the term strictly to the destruction of European Jewry by the Nazis, with some writers positing that this event is so unique that even comparing it to other genocides constitutes a type of holocaust denial.<sup>4</sup>

This has not, however, dissuaded other scholars from using the term to describe genocides totally unrelated to the Nazi case. They did so essentially because they saw a similarity in the dynamics leading to the annihilation of people in all these cases. This was true in particular in instances where an ideology, or the attempt to transform society according to an ideological system, was seen to lead to genocide. Thus, Hryshko describes the holocaust as essentially an ideological genocide and applies the term to the destruction of Ukrainian peasantry during the man-made famine in 1932 and 1933.<sup>5</sup> Conquest describes not only this famine but also the mass destruction of peoples carried out under Stalin, in particular during the 1930s, as a holocaust.<sup>6</sup>

Vahakn Dadrian sees the slaughter of the Armenians by the Turks during the First World War as constituting a holocaust.<sup>7</sup> Shawcross uses the term to describe the killings under the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during the 1970s.<sup>8</sup>

Other scholars, rather than pointing to the ideological dimension of Nazism, focus on what they see as the racist and the Christian roots of Nazi anti-Semitism as causal factors in the destruction of European Jewry. They see similar dynamics at work in the decimation of Native peoples. Thus, Thornton and Stannard use the term “holocaust” to describe the near annihilation of Aboriginal peoples in the Americas by the European invaders after 1492.<sup>9</sup>

Other researchers, while preferring to confine the term holocaust to the destruction of European Jewry, nevertheless see its dynamics inherent in other genocides. Norman Cohn and H. R. Trevor-Roper, for example, believe that the same dynamics characterized the Nazi war on the Jews and the witch hunts in medieval Europe.<sup>10</sup> Similar dynamics are also evident in the Israelite war against the idolaters, as described in both Deuteronomy and the Book of Joshua of the Old Testament.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, we have essentially two different views regarding uses of the term “holocaust.” For some, the term applies only to the slaughter of European Jewry. Other scholars, however, use the term for a category into which a variety of genocides can be placed. Exploring the differences in these perspectives does not simply revolve around the use of a term. It provides insight into how words are used, whether to mark events in time or space or to categorize reality so as to facilitate our comprehension. Words establish identity and create linkages. In a Platonic sense, they establish linkages between the real world and the ideal world or the world of abstract thought. In our everyday experience, by giving a name to an event we give it an identity that serves both to relate it to, and differentiate it from, other events.

For example, by labelling the uprising of the American colonists against British imperial rule as the American Revolution, we give the event an identity; the term indicates where the event occurred and what type of event it was (i.e., an American revolution, the nature of which may be determined by comparing it to other revolutions). The term “holocaust” is not as obviously specific. Indeed, how the term relates to the destruction of people through genocide is little evident in the word itself, in part because that word has had but a brief history in this context and, as we have already seen, disagreements exist regarding its proper usage.

Disagreement over use of a term might be expected in the field of genocide studies. The area has been subject to intense investigation only since the Second World War. Its terminology and the different concepts used to guide explorations in the field are relatively new. To explore the term “holocaust” and its significance in the context of genocide, it is necessary to examine not only the word but also the genocides to which the term has been applied. In this book, I shall do both. To gain insight into what the term means when applied to genocide, it would be useful, first, to look at the word as it was originally used. A combination of two Greek words, *holos* (whole) and *kaustos* (burnt), the term “holocaust” means to bring a burnt offering, or to be offered as a whole burnt offering.<sup>12</sup> Chamoux gives some idea as to the meaning of this word as it was used to describe a particular religious ritual when he writes that in Greek polytheism the gods were divided into two broader categories: the gods of the sky (“*uranian*”) and the gods below or of the underworld (“*chthonian*”). The gods of the sky were considered to be helpful to man and the gods below dangerous. In religious rituals, worshippers, therefore, participated in partaking of sacrifices offered to gods of the sky, while in the chthonian sacrifice, to placate gods that were considered to be maleficent, the entire sacrifice was given up to the divinity, with the entire sacrifice being totally consumed by fire.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, the term “holocaust” referred originally to a sacrifice that involved the complete consumption by flames of the sacrificial animal being offered to the gods. It was part of a reli-

gious ritual intended to placate a deity, and was used by a community to avert danger and achieve harmony with the universal order.

To clarify how the term holocaust is pertinent when describing genocide, we need to examine more closely what is meant by genocide. The word was derived from the Greek *genos*, race, and from the Latin *caedere*, to kill. Literally translated, the word means to kill or annihilate a race. However, in genocide studies, use of the term was not confined to its literal meaning. Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term, defined "genocide" as the planned and coordinated annihilation of a national, religious, or racial group.<sup>14</sup> Lemkin also developed a typology to classify actual cases of genocide. He outlined three types of genocide, basing his typology on the intent of the perpetrator. The objective of the first type of genocide is to destroy totally a victim group or nation. According to Lemkin, wars of extermination in antiquity and the Middle Ages were examples of this first type of genocide. The second type is characterized by the destruction of a culture without an attempt to kill its bearers, prevalent in our time in instances where force is used to destroy the cultural identity of a group. The third type, a Nazi-style genocide, targeted some groups for immediate annihilation, while others were selected for ethnocidal assimilation.<sup>15</sup> At Lemkin's urging, the United Nations agreed to consider the issue of preventing and punishing genocide, and the UN Genocide Convention was adopted in 1948. This convention defined genocide as any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a nation or a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group:

- a. Killing members of a group;
- b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group;
- c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Generally, the UN definition has been seen as too vague, unworkable, and politically charged to be useful in scholarly analysis. Given these problems, Vahakn Dadrian set aside the UN definition and formulated a definition he considered more suitable for research purposes. He defined genocide as "the successful attempt by a dominant group, vested with formal authority and/or with preponderant access to the overall resources of power, to reduce by coercion or lethal violence the number of a minority group whose ultimate extermination is held desirable and useful and whose respective vulnerability is a major factor contributing to the decision for genocide."<sup>16</sup>

Dadrian also established a five-category typology of genocide: (1) cultural genocide, in which the objective is the assimilation of a target group; (2) latent genocide, or a destruction not intended by the perpetrator, an example being deaths caused by infectious diseases unintentionally spread by invading armies; (3) retributive genocide, intended to punish a group for actions committed by it or group(s) wherewith it is associated; (4) utilitarian genocide, in which mass killings become part of a process of taking possession of economic resources; and (5) optimal genocide, in which the perpetrator has as his main aim the annihilation of a group, goals Dadrian sees expressed in the destruction of European Jewry and the Ottoman Armenians.<sup>17</sup>

Although it has merits, Dadrian's typology also presents problems. An example is the first category of his typology. Most states have sought to assimilate minorities within their boundaries, be these newly arrived or long-established groups. Does Dadrian see endeavours to assimilate these different groups as acts of cultural genocide? If he does, then the term is too broad to be useful as a category for the study of genocide. If he does not, then a problem arises in

determining when attempts at assimilation become cultural genocide. To be useful, this category as well as others he developed need further elaboration.

Other scholars have also sought to improve on the UN definition of genocide. In 1983-84 Helen Fein made an effort to replace the UN definition of genocide with a more analytically rigorous concept by defining genocide as the calculated murder of a segment or all of a group regarded to be outside the perpetrator's "sanctioned universe of obligation." She introduced a four-part typology, that characterized genocide as (1) developmental, in which the perpetrator intentionally or unintentionally destroys peoples who stand in the way of the exploitation of resources; (2) despotic, in which a despot eliminates a real or potential opposition, as in a polarized multiethnic state; (3) retributive, involving the perpetrator's attempt to destroy an actual opponent; and (4) ideological, a category in which she places genocides against groups that an ideological system identifies as enemies or as embodying absolute evil. She argues further that ideological genocides and slaughters are primarily an outgrowth of myths that place the victims outside the "sanctioned universe of obligation." She considers murder a "latent implication of all totalitarian ideologies which elevate the concept of the people or class(es) of the people" and consider the concept of the individual as the product of an outdated, decadent social system.<sup>18</sup>

Later, Fein elaborated on her conceptualization, defining genocide as a "series of purposeful actions by a perpetrator(s) to destroy a collectivity through mass or selective murders of group members and suppressing the biological and social reproduction of the collectivity. . . . The perpetrator may represent the state of the victim, another state, or another collectivity."<sup>19</sup> Fein includes both political and social groups as victims, and in her explanation of her revised definition insists that individuals, and not only states and other authorities, can perpetrate genocides.

Leo Kuper, whose concept of genocide is based on the UN definition, divides genocide into two main groups: domestic genocides arising from the internal divisions within a society; and genocides arising in the course of international warfare. He distinguishes four types of domestic genocide: (1) genocides against indigenous peoples; (2) genocides against hostage groups; (3) genocides ensuing from decolonization which involves a two-tier structure of domination, in which the colonial power imposes its rule through a local surrogate; and (4) genocides resulting from the struggle between ethnic, racial, or religious groups, brought on when one group seeks greater power, status, or autonomy.

Under genocides of international warfare, Kuper includes examples such as the Allied bombing of Dresden, the American atomic bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the Chinese subjugation of Tibet, and the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor. Cases of political mass murder are placed outside his typology of genocide because they do not fall within the UN definition. Kuper places the mass murders carried out by the governments of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Kampuchea, Indonesia, and other states into this last category.<sup>20</sup>

Although Kuper makes a useful contribution to the development of a theoretical framework of genocide, many of his categories are too broad to be useful for the purpose of analysis. Building on earlier models of genocide, Roger W. Smith, in his 1987 essay on the twentieth century as an age of genocide, presents a five-part typology of genocide based on the motives of the perpetrator. His categories are: (1) retributive genocide, based on the desire for revenge; (2) institutional genocide, generally part of military conquest, in particular in ancient and medieval times; (3) utilitarian genocide, arising from the drive for material gain, and especially prevalent during the European conquest of the New World as well as in the decimation of small Aboriginal communities standing in the way of resource exploitation in the twentieth century; (4) monopolistic genocide, resulting from the competition for power, in particular in pluralistic

societies; and (5) ideological genocide, driven by the desire to save or purify a society, and common to the twentieth century (examples are the destruction of the enemy of the people in the Soviet Union and the Nazi destruction of European Jewry).<sup>21</sup>

Although Smith narrows Kuper's framework by looking at genocide essentially in terms of intent, this also presents problems, as will be seen later. Furthermore, what is not clear from the typologies discussed is whether genocide involves the total or partial destruction of a group. Analysts appear to agree that genocide involves either the total destruction or the destruction of a large part of a group. Chalk and Jonassohn see genocide as being synonymous with mass killing committed with the intent to destroy physically a real or imaginary category of people, as defined by the perpetrator. Expanding on this definition, they define genocide as a "form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator."<sup>22</sup> In addition, Chalk and Jonassohn classify genocides according to the motive of the perpetrator. These include (1) eliminating a real or potential threat; (2) spreading terror among real or potential enemies; (3) acquiring economic wealth; or (4) implementing a belief, theory, or ideology.<sup>23</sup>

Ward Churchill takes issue with the Chalk and Jonassohn definition, in particular its emphasis on one-sided mass killing, arguing that it is too restrictive.<sup>24</sup> Also, it is unclear how intent in the mass killing is linked to action. What is intent? How is it expressed? There have been examples in the past where groups have expressed the intent to wipe out other groups but have not done so. At what point does expression of intent, linked to action, make mass murder genocide? This emphasis on intent also raises the problem of linking cause with effect. The problem is evident in the example of murder for money. A person may kill someone else to take that person's money. The perpetrator does not necessarily want to kill this person, but does so to expedite the robbery. Our legal system defines this as murder. On a large scale, groups have in fact been wiped out in instances where the intent was not necessarily to destroy them but to deprive them of their possessions. In the process of working out its conceptualization of genocide, the United Nations General Assembly defined genocide as the denial of the right of existence to entire groups, just as homicide is the denial of the right to life for individual human beings.<sup>25</sup> The UN did not differentiate between killings in which a group was directly targeted and those carried out by a perpetrator pursuing some other objective. It focussed on the final result, namely the destruction of the group. This definition is also more in keeping with Webster's Dictionary (1984), which defines genocide as involving the systematic annihilation of a political, racial or cultural group. Here, again, emphasis is on process rather than intent.

The problem with arriving at a workable definition of genocide is partially political: different groups focus on definitions that emphasize their particular experience. In such instances, a definition, as Churchill points out, all too often serves to deny genocide or to support the claim that one group or another has a more valid claim to having suffered genocide.<sup>26</sup> The problem is also functional. How does one arrive at a definition that will describe the crime under the different conditions in which it occurred and, at the same time, not be so broad as to make it near to impossible to measure? This problem at times becomes evident in Churchill's definition of genocide. At the opposite extreme of Chalk and Jonassohn's extremely narrow definition, Churchill's definition is so broad and varied that it raises problems regarding classification, in particular in his categories outlining the types and degree of genocide.<sup>27</sup>

Perhaps the different views regarding targeting as it relates to genocide can best be brought together by looking at genocide not so much in terms of cause and effect but as a process that involves the systematic annihilation of a political, racial, social, or cultural group, or a major segment of such a group. As used here, "systematic" implies the repeated violent destruction of members of a group, which leads to the physical annihilation of the group or a large segment

thereof. Such violence may express itself in direct killing. It may also express itself through imposing conditions that lead to the destruction of the group or a large segment thereof. Accordingly, the term “genocide” may be seen to involve the systematic violent destruction of a large segment or all of a group as defined by the perpetrator. The mass murder may result from a particular group being targeted either directly or indirectly. Direct targeting involves killing members of a group whose destruction is deemed desirable because the group is seen as having characteristics justifying such action. Indirect targeting involves the murder of members of a group whose destruction is justified, not in itself, but to achieve some other objective. In most instances, this objective involves robbery, with the killing being carried out to deprive the target group of its possessions. For the purpose of this study, I will not further break down this definition according to type of genocide. Researchers whose works I have mentioned have already presented ample categories. My objective is not to add to them, but rather to determine how genocides described as holocausts fit into the categories I have outlined in my discussion of their work.

How does the term “holocaust,” coined to describe a religious ritual, apply to describe genocide or a particular type of genocide? It may be applicable in several respects. It may describe genocide insofar as that genocide is associated with a certain type of hero worship. More significant, it is applicable in situations where genocide has as its goal the total destruction of a group, particularly where the genocidal group links this destruction to the search for salvation. Of the different types of genocide examined, these dynamics are most evident in what researchers have called ideological genocides, that is, where the introduction of an ideological system becomes linked with the destruction of a target group that is seen as thwarting endeavours to create an idealized state of existence for the genocidal group.

Of course, use of the term “holocaust” also has major limitations when applied to genocide. The basic driving force in the holocaust sacrifice as practised by the Greeks was atonement. In making a sacrifice, the Greek felt no hatred toward the sacrificial animal and did not consider it evil. The basic intention behind the ritual was to bring humanity into harmony with the universal order. In contrast, the basic intention motivating one group to destroy another is not atonement but hatred and anger. These emotions have little to do with atonement, but rather derive their motivating force from war psychology. As such, the group isolated for destruction is used to keep the genocidal group continuously aware of the outside threat. This threat is, in large part, moral rather than physical in nature. Killing the agent of this danger involves overcoming a powerful, corrupting evil and destroying its nefarious influences.

Using the term “holocaust” in the context of genocide also presents another problem. This relates to the feasibility of using a term developed in one context in another context. Thus, Novic mentions that certain Jewish scholars object to the term “holocaust,” which they see as a Christian concept, being used to describe Jewish suffering. They prefer the Hebrew term for catastrophe, *shoah*— seen as purely Jewish and secular.<sup>28</sup> Of course, the term “holocaust” refers to the pagan Greek rather than to the Christian religious experience. At the same time, in particular Jewish scholars stress the holocaust nature of the destruction of European Jewry. They see this as differentiating Nazi goals regarding the Jews from Nazi goals regarding other groups, with the difference making the Jewish case unique. Therefore, I will use the term “holocaust” to describe the different genocides under discussion here. However, it is to be understood that when I use the term “holocaust” to describe the destruction of European Jewry by the Nazis, I am also speaking of the *shoah*.

The question may be asked whether it really matters if we use the term “holocaust” or any other to describe a particular genocide. In many respects it doesn’t. Yet, clearly, once a term or category has been applied to a particular event or type of event, it is important to have some

agreement as to its meaning. This is even more necessary when words or terms are used to categorize the behaviour of one group or a number of groups for comparative purposes. Categorization has been used in all areas of study, especially in the sciences. In the biological sciences, terms have been coined to help us describe species and sub-species. In the social sciences, such as psychology, terms such as schizophrenia or paranoia have been coined to describe patterns of dysfunctional behaviour. These terms not only help us understand certain patterns of behaviour but also help us do something about the behaviour in question so as to change it.

If we are to use terms to help us understand and prevent genocide, it is very important that the terms used be as clear as possible. With the study of genocide still in its infancy, we are still searching for suitable concepts to describe these horrendous deeds. It is important that we make real efforts to reach some consensus regarding the descriptive terms used. Only in this way can we be certain that others know what we are talking about. Consensus would not only contribute to a better understanding of genocide but would also help us identify means of doing something to combat such actions.

This is why it is important to clarify terms and concepts that have been developed to date, in particular the term "holocaust," it being the only instance where a name has been applied to identify a specific genocide, with some scholars arguing that the term can apply only to the destruction of European Jewry by the Nazis, and others going so far as to argue that this event is so unique that even comparing it to other genocides constitutes a type of genocide denial. Of course, this has not discouraged others from applying the term to other genocides. Disagreement over usage has been further encouraged by the fact that no one has looked at the term in detail, exploring the various situations in which it has been used to describe genocide and then isolating those features that make the term applicable in one situation and not in another.

For any term to be useful, it must help us to establish limits that differentiate one pattern of behaviour from others. Although some overlap is inevitable, sufficient differentiation is needed to permit us to say that this pattern of behaviour more properly fits into one category than another. For example, in psychology the various categories used to classify different behavioural patterns are generally clear enough to permit an analyst to identify a person with mental illness as being schizophrenic, paranoid, or as having a combination of both conditions. Yet, conclusions were possible only after terms were coined to describe different patterns of mental illness. Before this could be done, different examples of mental illness had to be examined, compared, and contrasted so as to determine to what pattern of mental illness a certain term applied. If the term "holocaust" is not to be used to argue that a genocide is unique and then again applied to different types of genocide, certain characteristics must be isolated to define it. One way of accomplishing this is by examining different genocides in which the term has been used and then extrapolating common features. Such an exercise will help determine whether the term applies more suitably to a single, unique genocide, or a pattern of genocide, and, if the latter, to what pattern.

As most researchers see the holocaust as an ideological genocide, I will first look at ideological genocides that have been described as holocausts to see in what ways they are similar and different. I will look at the destruction of the idolaters as described in the Old Testament, essentially because it is the earliest account I have found where a group undertook to totally destroy another group in order to attain its own salvation. Following this, I will look at the destruction of witches in early modern Europe, of the Armenians, of the enemies of the people in the Soviet Union during the 1930s, of European Jewry, and of the enemies of the people in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge.



I will then examine genocides committed as Europeans conquered the New World. When doing so, I will look at the nature of the destruction, the motives behind the killings, as well as at other features evident in these genocides. I will also examine more closely the similarities between ideological genocides that have been identified as holocausts and the genocides in the Americas to determine what may have caused researchers to identify the genocides committed in the New World as holocausts.

Genocides committed as Europeans colonized the Americas tend to be little known, and, where they are known, ignored. It was not until some five hundred years after Columbus's initial voyage to the New World that any significant attention was given to the negative effect of European conquest on Aboriginal societies. Where these genocides have been studied, researchers have tended to place them rather arbitrarily into general categories of genocide with little attempt to analyse how particular instances fit into the framework. Thus, Fein places these genocides collectively into the category of developmental genocides, while Roger W. Smith labels them utilitarian genocides. In neither case is an attempt made to determine how any of the genocides committed against Native peoples fits into these categories.

Increasingly, scholars are recognizing that these genocides must be looked at in detail if we are going to understand contemporary genocides, including the destruction of European Jewry by the Nazis. Commenting on this, Vinay Lal states that, although the destruction of European Jewry may serve as a prime example of exclusion and victimization in European history, from the standpoint of Third World scholars, similar destruction has been visited upon Native peoples by their European conquerors during the last five hundred years. The main difference is that the Nazis inflicted their destruction on white Europeans rather than on peoples of colour.<sup>29</sup> Commenting on Lal's statement, Bartov remarks that, while Europeans exported their perception of society to the rest of the world, they imported into Europe the manner of conduct and views of humanity that evolved in the colonies. He concludes that this complex relationship, which affected not only Europeans but also the rest of the world, has to be further explored if we are to understand the mechanics of modern genocide.<sup>30</sup> Stannard is one of the first scholars to make a major effort to explore the literature in some detail to place genocides committed in the Americas into the context of present-day genocide. For this purpose, he compares the dynamics involved in the destruction of European Jewry with the dynamics leading to the destruction of Natives in the Americas, which he describes as the most massive act of genocide in the history of the world.<sup>31</sup>

A variety of motives fuelled the drive for expansion by the different European powers. Essentially medieval, and still relishing its victories over the Moors, Spain was driven to expand into the New World by the quest for gold, Indian subjects, land, military title, and souls. Under the *encomienda* system, land and people were distributed among the conquerors, who proceeded to enslave and exploit the Native population. Legal protection promised by Spanish legislation did little to protect Native peoples from inhumane treatment. The most glaring example of this may be seen in the annihilation of the Arawak in Hispaniola (comprised today of Haiti and the Dominican Republic).

France and Britain, embarking on a quest for colonies in the seventeenth century, had a somewhat different focus than the Spaniards in their colonial ambitions. France's colonial policy was dictated by its interests in the fur trade, a corollary of which was the necessity for good relations with Native peoples. To forward its interests, France did little to expand settlement in New France, its major colony in the Americas: in 1715, French settlement here stood at only 18,500, compared to a population of 400,000 of European origin in Britain's American colonies. French interest in the fur trade also led it to recognize the sovereignty of the Indians in 1701.<sup>32</sup> Although the record of France in dealing with Native peoples is much better than that of Spain, there is evidence that France did not shy away from genocide when it suited its purpose, as may

be seen in the destruction of the Natchez in 1731. Genocides in the British colonies resulted from a desire by the invader to obtain possession of Native lands, as may be seen from the decimation of Native groups in both North America and the Australian subcontinent.

In this book, I shall use a multiple case-study approach to gain insight into ideological genocides and genocides committed as Europeans conquered the New World. In a multiple case-study approach, argues Yin,<sup>33</sup> a major goal is to build a general explanation that fits each of the individual cases, even though the cases will vary in their details. Such an approach was used, for example, in Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* to isolate common features of development in different cultural milieus.<sup>34</sup> My objective is to examine the different genocides identified as holocausts to determine in what respects a particular case of genocide is unique, as well as to isolate the features individual cases share with other genocides.

Thus, after having looked at the different ideological genocides described as holocausts, I will isolate basic features in them so as to be better able to compare and contrast dynamics leading to destruction. Genocides committed as Europeans conquered the New World will then be compared and contrasted with each other to determine whether common patterns emerge and, if so, what these patterns are. Ideological genocides and genocides committed as Europeans took possession of the New World will be compared to determine similarities and differences.

All genocides looked at will be examined with reference to the typology of genocide as it has been developed to date. Therefore, the study will do much more than seek to determine whether the term "holocaust" more accurately describes a particular genocide or a type of genocide. Using the holocaust as its focus, the study will explore the usefulness of applying a typology to understand the holocaust and genocide in general. It will seek to refine some of the typologies used to date. At the same time, by isolating basic dynamics in the holocaust and other genocides under consideration, the study will endeavour to provide insight into the forces leading to genocide under different conditions. Such insight may suggest what might be done to prevent similar cataclysms from recurring in the future.