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Why Do Autocracies Fall?

Internal Political Factors

Pietro Grilli di Cortona

The goal of this chapter is to explore the internal political dynamics that led to the fall of autocratic regimes during the Third Wave of democratization. I will not deal with economic causes (see the chapter by Luca Germano) or those concerning stateness, (see my chapter with Nicoletta Di Sotto). Instead, I will discuss internal political factors, though not “structural” factors such as levels of development, class structure and income inequality (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2013, 5). Although important in any study, these factors tend to be overrated, especially with respect to Latin America and Africa, and we will see that they are not of primary importance in regime transformation.

Although recognizing how difficult it is to draw a clear line between internal and international factors, in other chapters Barbara Pisciotta, Antonino Castaldo, and Eric Terzuolo deal with the international dimension. All issues concerning stateness straddle that line. Even when you speak of the spread of a regime from one country to another, it is often difficult to distinguish between cross-national transmission of values and institutional models and the introduction of a concomitant concentration of emerging factors in a region (Brinks and Coppedge 2006, 465). In addition, the precise intersection of internal and international dimensions is often very difficult to pinpoint, since causal effects can go in both directions. The “Carnation Revolution” in Portugal (1974) was an internal event caused by armed forces exhausted by colonial wars (external factor), while Greece’s military adventure in Cyprus (1974) and Argentina’s in the Falkland Islands (1982) were international events determined by internal causes (essentially, the two military regimes’ loss of prestige and consensus).

Despite these various causal combinations, the division between internal and international factors, and the attribution to one or the other of a major explanatory role, has solid roots in the international literature that has evolved over time. The 1986 work edited by O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead seemed to emphasize internal aspects, while Whitehead's 1996 work emphasized the importance of the international variable that clearly emerged in the regime transitions of the 1990s. From the 1990s on, the international variable, and its entwinement with internal factors, has received a great deal of attention (see the bibliographies of the chapters in this book that deal with this issue). The works by Magen and Morlino (2008) and Levitsky and Way (2005; 2010) are particularly interesting, and the "international-domestic nexus" is central to the analyses in Stoner and McFaul (2013).

The wave of transformations that occurred beginning in the first half of the 1970s overturned 83 regimes, producing significant change, but not always in a democratic direction. In reality, the various democratic results (consolidated democracies, relatively stable or intermittent) amounted to only 43 out of the 83 countries involved. The remaining 37 were mostly hybrid regimes and some were regressions toward new authoritarian forms (Grilli di Cortona 2014). If we add to these cases the so-called Arab Spring of 2011-2013, only Tunisia seems to have taken a credible democratic path. In the other cases the results, at least to date, seem to be civil war and the partial or total collapse of the state (Syria, Libya, Yemen) or the transition to new authoritarian forms (Egypt).

The End of Old Regimes

At the theoretical level, it is evident that there are three crucial aspects in the study of the crisis and fall of political regimes. The first is to identify indicators or signals that the old regime is about to end. When can you effectively say that it has entered its final crisis? How do you recognize it? Secondly, one must identify the principal motivation for change, with the understanding that the end of a regime can never be attributed to a single cause. (Scholarly explanations are never monocausal.) The reasons are almost always in reality a concatenation of causes. It is evident, though, that in each

case there are causes that are more important and significant, and that sometimes these can become truly decisive. The third crucial aspect is the outcome of the regime's transformation, or rather the end point, which offers us the opportunity to understand, for example, whether it is a democratization or not.

I will make only a few observations on points 1 and 3, and concentrate on point 2. Concerning point 1, you can say that a regime falls and ceases to exist in the presence of two possible groups of circumstances. First and foremost, when it is overthrown by illegal and violent means, for example, a coup d'état, revolution, civil war, or foreign invasion. The most traumatic event indicating the end of a regime can be the ouster of the dictator with whom the regime is identified. A study of cases between 1946 and 2004 (Escribà-Folch 2013) found that, in regime change, 47% of dictators were imprisoned, killed, or sent into exile.¹ In all cases in which the transition is discontinuous and traumatic, it is very easy to identify when the regime collapses and the new political order begins. Changes in the elites, the rules, and institutions go at the same speed. Although the modalities differed greatly, the end of the Caetano regime in Portugal in 1974-1975, of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1979, and of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia in 1989 all belong to this typology. In totally different conditions and with different results, the end of the old regimes decreed by the Arab Spring in 2011 and 2012 occurred in the same manner. The traumatic nature and rupture with the past marking a political change are especially evident when accompanied by a change in the form of the state, as occurred in all the former Soviet republics (Way 2005).

A second type of change is instead more subtle, with all or some of the old regime's elite managing the change. In this case, transformation is less traumatic and more continuous (Morlino 2003; Grilli di Cortona 2009). There are no drastic ruptures. Rather than being replaced or abolished, norms and institutions are integrated, bent, and adapted to the new situation. Most administrative and even some political personnel remain in play, albeit with the collaboration of parts of the political opposition. In Spain and Hungary, for example, it was the old elites that launched the change, attempting to combine real and important transformation with some continuity. In fact, this type of transition should not be underestimated. The

change is real, it is just more difficult to pinpoint the moment when the autocratic regime ends. At a certain point, however, the transition is complete. In the case of democratization, this is demonstrated by competitive elections, the restoration of civil rights and political freedom, and the reform or creation of democratic institutions. In the case of other types of transitions (for example, towards new types of authoritarianism or hybrid regimes) it is demonstrated by the formation of new pacts, changes in the composition of the elites (even if sometimes the personnel do not change), and often even a change in “political formula,” i.e. the regime’s political culture and ideological configuration. The transitions in the 1990s of certain post-Soviet republics and African regimes come to mind (Carbone 2005; Grilli di Cortona 2014). Other factors, including the context in which the change takes place, require consideration. Authoritarian leadership can consist of a single or hegemonic party, the armed forces, a royal family and its entourage, a group that identifies with a leader’s personal power, or a combination of these actors. The transition from one actor to another indicates a significant change, but sometimes even the perpetuation of a dominant actor can entail a considerable shift, if accompanied by changes in other dimensions. A royal family can support the transformation from a despotic monarchical regime to a constitutional monarchy, as in Nepal in 1990, or a military leader may alternate with another from the same inner circle (same national, religious or ethnic group), changing the person but not necessarily the regime.

As for the transformation’s results, we already have seen how, despite the sweeping movement of nations towards democracy during the Third Wave of democratization, not all countries became democratic. To be systematic, the results can be categorized thus: regime survival, perhaps under a partially renewed leadership; democratization, to a variable extent; replacement of the old autocratic regime with a new one (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2012).

Internal pressure for change can originate from three different and distinct groups of sources, often capable of interacting, nurturing each other, and melding: the legacy of the past; civil society and an organized opposition; elite internal dynamics. Each of these sources of change develops thanks to a situation favorable to the weakening of the regime. During the Third Wave, among the

factors included in such a favorable context, we must consider the international ones discussed in other chapters of this book, as well as the failure of the legitimizing role of the great ideologies of the 20th century (Fascism, Communism, Corporatism, etc.) on which many of the world's authoritarian regimes long rested, having been presented as alternative models to fragile Western democracies. After World War II, when some of the old ideologies collapsed or lost momentum, democracy was again proposed as a successful model, and many surviving authoritarian political regimes justified themselves as transitional regimes, their existence aimed at restoring social peace, the pursuit of economic development, combating corruption, etc. (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 15).

The role of ideologies at the global level is also a subject of interest for Linz and Stepan (1996, 74ff.), who assert that the difference between the 1920s and the 1970s consists in the fact that, in the 1920s, the *Zeitgeist* (spirit of the times) saw competition among at least five ideological models: the Soviet Union's Communism, Italy's Fascism, Catholic integralism (i.e. belief in an integral unity of faith with political thought), a conservatism that still considered authoritarian and pre-democratic constitutional monarchies as valid models (for example, Imperial Germany), and finally democracy, which began to establish itself in a dozen or so countries that had no previous democratic traditions. In these conditions, the authoritarian models still seemed to be successful and enjoyed the support of significant parts of the population and, in some cases (especially Communism and Fascism), exercised a certain attraction outside of the countries where they were established. Undemocratic ideas circulated with success, and not just in Europe. In Latin America they supported institutional experiences such as Vargas's *l'Estado Novo* in Brazil, beginning in the 1930s, or Peronism in Argentina after the Second World War. Indeed, despite the collapse of Fascism at the end of the war, authoritarian institutional models survived up to the 1960s, making the prospects for the spread of democracy rather remote (Maier 1994; Bell and Staeheli 2001).

Beginning in the 1970s the situation was very different. As we have seen, authoritarian ideologies lost all prestige and were discredited even among the middle classes that often had promoted them. After Vatican II (1961-1963) the Catholic Church increasingly

developed positions in harmony with democratic concepts (Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996). With a lag of more than 20 years, Communist ideology as well suffered a drastic reappraisal and weakening in regimes that based their legitimacy on it. Marxism-Leninism had already lost its vigor by the 1970s and for younger generations had no appeal whatsoever. The Communist model appears to have missed most of the objectives that had promoted its expansion and rise to power in many countries, ending up by legitimizing repressive regimes dominated by tiresome rituals that publics considered increasingly anachronistic. Some attempts at innovation and reform were successful, such as the New Economic Mechanism in Hungary, which introduced typical free market criteria to the management of factories (Hankiss 1990). Others were destined to fail, at least in the short term, such as the economic reforms in Czechoslovakia that culminated in the tragic end of the Prague Spring in 1968, and the birth in August 1980 of the free labor union in Poland, then outlawed in December 1981. After these events, a crisis in Communist regimes was fairly predictable, only a matter of time (Grilli di Cortona 1989).

For its part, compared to the 1920s and 30s, the democratic model strengthened and became attractive pretty much everywhere in the world. All regimes sought, not always successfully and often rather hypocritically, to don democratic clothing. One reason the Colonels' regime in Greece had difficulty in solidifying and establishing itself at the end of the 1960s was the greater prestige of the democratic model at the international level, a model that was distinctly on the defensive in the 1920s and 30s when the authoritarian regimes of the Iberian peninsula were developing (Diamandourous 1986, 145). We can say the same about the Chilean junta and Pinochet's attempts at institutionalization beginning at the end of the 1970s. As in the 1990s, it was evident that the "spirit of the times" was clearly in favor of democracy. Authoritarian and totalitarian forms were generally viewed negatively. One cannot overlook this change in ideological and cultural orientation when studying the crisis of autocracies from the 1970s on.

Coming to the sources of change, except for the legacies of the past, the other factors are all connected to the role of political actors (leaders, elites, political parties, unions, associations, groups,

the military, organized movements) capable of controlling political resources and exercising influence on the direction and extent of political change. Along with international influences, whether political actors take moderate or radical positions, or prefer democratic or authoritarian institutional models, has great importance in explaining political change, its success or failure and its outcomes. Legacies play a conditioning role, with the past offering a variety of models on which to draw: the presence of institutions that are part of the country's historical tradition; a political experience to look to as a model to revive or as a negative model to avoid; the legacies of a previous colonial occupation; historic memory. Specific situations influence the degree of popular mobilization, and organized oppositions, legal or semi-legal, assume particular importance when the old regime appears weak and incapable of controlling the development of civil society, with alternative organizations taking form, e.g. political parties, unions, movements, and pressure groups (sometimes even within the establishment).

Finally, the internal dynamics of the old regime's elite (of whatever variety) hark back to many factors, from the nature and solidity of the pacts and alliances on which the coalition in power stands, to problems of succession (a real thorn in the side of many authoritarian regimes), and to the birth of out and out conflicts within the elite that can weaken or send it into crisis. For example, it is well known that military regimes have a shorter duration than single-party regimes (Nordlinger 1977; Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Kailitz 2013) and that democratization is the most likely outcome once the stimuli that originally induced the armed forces to seize power have been exhausted (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2012). The following section addresses in more detail the three main sources of internal pressure for change: legacies; civil society and anti-regime mobilization; internal dynamics of elites.

The Role of Legacy

The legacy of the past is that patrimony of experiences, values, traditions, practices, and historical memory that is transmitted to old and new political actors, restricting their choices and behavior, and that ends up conditioning the character, path, and results of po-

litical change (Grilli di Cortona and Lanza, 2011; Lanza 2012). Each change is also the product of so-called *confining conditions* (Kirchheimer 1965), namely that combination of influences, conditioning, and limitations that must be overcome or adapted to, but that in any case determines successive choices and decisions. The reference here is specifically to the legacies of experiences that preceded the autocratic regime and that obviously contribute to its weakening and delegitimization. Some of the conditions that favor regime change are inherited from the past: influences of the colonial experience or the role of certain cultural and religious factors (for example, ethnic composition and attending hostility between different linguistic, national and tribal groups, discussed in my chapter with Nicoletta Di Sotto). The endurance and cohesion of the state and its structures, the organization of civil society with its greater or lesser potential for mobilization, also are factors that can explain the differences between countries in the push for change and its efficacy. These are variables that can positively unite with an innovative process and bring the authoritarian experience to an end, sometimes with an opening towards more democratic institutions.

The weight and power of legacy depend on how the different legacies are filtered and reinterpreted by autocratic regimes: the longer such regimes last, and the more they display internal innovative and transformational characteristics, perhaps fed by strong ideological motivations and the ability to mobilize, the more the legacies of the past are conditioned and funneled in specific directions. In the USSR, Portugal, Spain, and the countries of Eastern Europe, non-democratic regimes had more than 40 years to mold new generations, impose behaviors and values, and consolidate institutions. The Communist regimes added heavy-handed internal transformations (of civil society, the economic system, cultural aspects) dictated by the revolutionary force of Marxism-Leninism. In Greece, on the other hand, the limited duration of the authoritarian phase (seven years) and the general ideological inconsistency of the Colonels' regime did not permit the military to influence either society or the state deeply. Brief duration of the non-democratic phase can facilitate the rapid reconstitution of political parties and institutions, with the eventuality that individual political representatives can even reclaim their roles in the political arena (Grilli di Cortona 2011).

The legacy of a colonial past comes in various forms, and often with contradictory influences. This can be read as a variable straddling internal and external factors. The crucial question is the following: Can a colonial past constitute a legacy that is a negative factor in terms of the stability and duration of an autocratic experience? On this point, according to Diamond (1988, 6-10) and referring to Africa, we can make the following observations. First of all, even when a colonizing country has comparatively liberal institutions, in the colonized country political participation can be attained only after many years, is limited to a small elite, and certainly is not for the majority of the population. Secondly, the colonizing country always introduces a model of political relations that is based on violence, in the form of repression and coercion, rather than on dialog and negotiation. This has a direct influence on how the new indigenous political class exercises power when the colony becomes independent. In essence, a colonial past establishes power management practices that are coherent and compatible with an authoritarian order. Thirdly, the colonial experience is not only authoritarian, but fundamentally statist. Control is imposed on commerce, agriculture, and the exploitation of raw materials. Various types of monopolies are imposed on most of the internal sources of income. Finally, the participation of locals in the higher levels of public administration is generally discouraged and seen with diffidence, with the result that, once independence is obtained, most of these countries are unprepared to create and manage the mechanisms of government. This also explains the fragility of public institutions, an effect of choices made during the colonial era which remain a negative legacy, responsible for difficulties in the *state building* set in motion with independence.

Despite these negative legacies, especially advantageous for the preservation of an authoritarian order, the colonial experience also can contribute to limiting the authoritarian characteristics in a newly independent state, and sometimes even weaken them. This can occur when certain institutions are created, even at an embryonic level. The transfer of power in British colonies was accomplished via constitutional mechanisms and logic. In the French colonies, Africans with high levels of education were allowed to enter the French National Assembly. The pattern in Portuguese colonies was

different: their democratization was more the product of emulating what was occurring in Lisbon in the 1970s than of the presence of prior institutions and practices. Diamond (1988, 9-10) calls attention to the nature and manner of the decolonization process. Where independence came without extensive mobilization of the masses and, especially, without an armed struggle for national liberation, the new state was born without a potential source of anti-democratic pressure. A comparison between Algeria and Senegal illustrates this point well. While in Algeria there was a long and bloody anti-colonial revolution that led to the formation of an authoritarian regime, largely dominated by the military heirs of the National Liberation Front, in Senegal the absence of a war of liberation, significant mass mobilization, and sanctioning of violence as a method of political expression allowed for the development of a more democratic style and behavior in the new political elite, facilitating the abandonment of authoritarian characteristics initially present in the newly independent state.

In many African countries, the duration and the characteristics of colonial control not only shaped the structuring of the political system and public administration, but also the culture of each individual country, and thus had important repercussions for the configuration of the political institutions that were formed after independence. Sometimes it is the colonial power that directly or indirectly creates conditions favorable for democratization. The choices and political evolution of the colonizing or occupying country can have an important explanatory role. The United Kingdom was influential in Botswana's political development, beginning contact in 1959 with the internal elites to draft a constitution that gave birth to an independent nation with democratic institutions. It was also the United Kingdom that left a partially trained and autonomous administrative class in Ghana and elsewhere in West Africa that helped in the development of democratic institutions. In Namibia, South Africa's own internal evolution was notably influential. It explains why South Africa was not able to delay granting independence and beginning a political transition. Portugal's transition was strictly tied to colonial issues. The "Carnation Revolution" originated largely in the armed forces' unwillingness to continue colonial wars where there was absolutely no prospect

of victory. As mentioned earlier, political change in Lisbon was concurrent with the beginning of the dismantlement of Portugal's colonial empire, and in turn represented an important opportunity for various countries. Leaders in what became independent Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, Mozambique, and East Timor took advantage of the changes occurring in Lisbon to initiate their own internal changes. Thanks to French influence, the establishment of democratic practices in Senegal dates back far to the past, when the French granted participation in municipal governments and even the election of a representative to the parliament in Paris.

Previous democratic experiences also can have a role in weakening a non-democratic regime (Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2011; Lanza 2012). As Huntington (1991) pointed out, past existence of a more or less embryonic democracy, pluralism, and market economy makes an authoritarian regime's stability less probable and fosters conditions more favorable to its obsolescence and collapse. A certain number of states that saw regime change during the Third Wave had some democratic history (Grassi 2008). This group included Spain, Portugal, Greece, South Korea, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic countries, East Germany, Hungary, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay. These countries were able to rely on a patrimony of past experiences that potentially could weaken non-democratic regimes. These included institutions and institutional models, clandestine leaders or exiles ready to step in and provide an alternative to the authoritarian political class, and political party or union organizations, whether clandestine or abroad, ready to revive at any time and contribute to organizing protests and to the rebirth of the opposition, historic memory, and political learning. In the transition to mass democracy, even countries where there was a "racial oligarchy" made use of strong democratic institutions originally reserved for the white minority.

Some countries admittedly had only fragile and brief prior democratic experiences, the only trace of which remained the historic memory of the errors committed, explaining the weakness, ephemeral nature, and fall of the democratic experience.² These are past experiences that members of the opposition harken back to as points of reference and institutional models (political learn-

ing). For example, the rather ephemeral democratic experiences of the Baltic countries in the 1920s provided an incentive to return to being independent democratic states, as well as institutional and constitutional models for the new democratic phase. It is no coincidence that Estonia and Latvia relied on reinstatement of their 1920s constitutions. This is what Huntington (1991, 42) describes as the *second try pattern*, which can explain the success of certain democratizations as a result of learning from past errors.

On the other hand, in certain circumstances legacies carry more weight, such as when democratic structures and institutions are not completely eliminated, and perhaps continue to operate under the radar, even with a certain amount of tolerance (perhaps intermittent) on the part of the regime. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 19-21), political parties, social movements, interest groups, autonomous agencies, forms of local government, and other institutions that are able to survive, even in a clandestine form, contribute to eroding an autocratic regime, and in certain cases can demonstrate an extraordinary capacity to reemerge. In Brazil, the generals who took over in 1964 ruled largely by distorting the basic institutions of political democracy, rather than by dismantling them (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 22). Officially, political parties were illegal, but their reemergence was tolerated. Parliament had no real power, but continued to carry out certain functions and, over time, recovered a certain amount of authority. This made the transition from authoritarianism to a democratic regime easier and less traumatic. In Greece, the authoritarian experience under the Colonels was very brief (1967-74) which in part facilitated the return to power of the same political actors, and even of the same pre-1967 political alignments. The democratic legacy experienced in different forms in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland between the two world wars clearly reemerged at times under the Communist regimes formed after World War II. During the Hungarian uprising in 1956, many Hungarian political parties from the 1930s and 40s reappeared. During the Prague Spring in 1968, the strong influence of the traditions of political pluralism and market economics found in the territories that became part of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 were evident, in addition to the legacies of the interwar period. The whole story of *Solidarność* in Poland (1980-

81) had solid roots in the tradition of the “White” and “Red” union movements of the 1930s (Grilli di Cortona 1989).

Civil Society and Anti-Regime Mobilization

The resurrection of civil society and mass mobilization can seriously undermine a regime and create significant cracks within the elite. Like rifts within elites, civil society and anti-regime mobilization are only one link (even if in some cases decisive) in the chain of events that leads to a regime crisis. Reasons of an economic nature, others tied to ethnic, religious, and linguistic identity, and various kinds of political issues also can promote mobilization.

Economic development has always contributed to the growth of the middle class and to forging civil society. If development fails and the economic crisis is so grave that it affects the citizens’ quality of life, the latter will mobilize via civil society organizations (unions, political parties, movements, groups) and challenge the regime. This sequence (first development, which creates rising expectations, then crisis and the fall of all socio-economic indicators) is relatively frequent, and often a contributing factor in the end of authoritarian regimes.

Ethnic, religious, and cultural causes also can have strong potential for mobilization (Way 2005, 238). If opposition leaders can appeal to sentiments of identity, mass mobilization against the regime becomes more probable. In some Communist regimes, the effectiveness of the opposition’s actions depended greatly on its ability to make itself the standard bearer of the struggle for national liberation. In these cases, the emotional tension reaches its peak and the response of the masses is ready, as in the case of the huge demonstrations in the Baltic countries in 1989-90. The importance of the nationalist and patriotic call fades or assumes problematic connotations when two nationalist poles face off, as in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, where the pro-Russian and pro-Western poles were at odds. The first to mobilize are usually artists, intellectuals, students, human rights movements, unions, and political parties, with demands for civil rights, freedom of the press, the right to strike, free elections, etc.

Popular mobilization is often driven and fueled by a leader able

to catalyze, unify and guide the opposition. Mobilization can come in various forms, depending on whether or not it is violent, its duration and repetitiveness, if it involves labor organizations (therefore, with strikes in various sectors), how large and extensive it is, and how much support it attracts from internal and international organizations. Violent mobilization can alienate sectors of the population that fear a breakdown in public order and security, and can provoke the opposite of the intended effect, a strengthening of the authoritarian regime. On the other hand, a large, peaceful, widespread, and continuous mobilization creates conditions favorable to a crisis in the authoritarian regime (Schock 2005; Bermeo 2003), unifying the opposition and institutionalizing an eventual emerging leadership. If the regime's reaction is violent, mobilization can expand further and create conditions for opening negotiations in which a third party (a religious organization, foreign country, non-governmental organization, etc.) can acquire a mediating role. Negotiations *de facto* legitimize the opposition (as occurred in Poland in 1980) making it costly and difficult to turn back.

In half of the countries involved in Third Wave, transformations featured grassroots mobilizations, which were to varying degrees peaceful, effective, and connected with sectors of the elite trying to control the change. In Spain and Greece these phenomena did not occur to any great extent (except for the Greek student demonstration in fall 1973), while in Portugal mobilization was in large part generated and encouraged by revolutionary members of the military, with the goal of creating for external consumption the image of a popular revolution. In Argentina, something of a mass uprising occurred when, after the defeat in the Falklands War, a process of change was clearly beginning. Limiting ourselves to a few examples, important mobilizations were seen also in Peru, the Philippines, Nepal, South Africa, Czechoslovakia, and Chile at the end of the 1980s.

The economic crisis in Peru in the 1970s was decisive for the development of an increasingly active popular movement. General Velasco Alvarado's removal in 1975 created high expectations in the population, spreading the feeling that they were entering a new era. There was new unrest among political parties, movements, and unions, with increasing protests and demonstrations. These did not

cease even with repression by the regime. (Velasco Alvarado had been replaced by General Morales Bermúdez, who announced the beginning of a “second phase” of the Peruvian revolution). Civil society initiatives, publications, and protests continued to proliferate, culminating with the 1977 strike to which all opposition political forces adhered. It was a resounding success (Cotler 1986). The government’s attempts to open to the business class and to political parties traditionally sidelined by the regime, such as the center-left *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA) and *Acción Popular* (AP) not only did not obtain the desired results, but de facto helped unite the opposition in a loud demand for the return of democracy. Even the *Partido Popular Cristiano* (PPC), an expression of the right-wing middle class, joined in this demand. There is no doubt that the series of civil society mobilizations induced the government to seek an agreement with the two major political parties (APRA and PPC), consisting of a promise to transfer power to civilians after the election of a constituent assembly.

In the Philippines, the Marcos regime ended because of its inability to contain and repress the Communist guerillas and to handle the economic crisis. The first problem began at the end of the 1960s, with the birth of the New People’s Army, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an increasing worry for the United States. In fact, guerrillas were present in most provinces, controlled about 20% of the country’s villages, and were responsible for innumerable acts of violence, especially in Mindanao province (Jackson 1988). The economic crisis began to make itself felt in the second half of the 1970s, especially hitting the incomes of the lower classes. It became increasingly dangerous for the regime’s stability when, between 1983 and 1986, it began to hit the upper middle and business classes, which until then had supported Marcos. The 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino, exponent of a growing democratic opposition, contributed to the regime’s increasing unpopularity, and its loss of support from the United States and the Catholic Church. Hundreds of thousands of people mobilized for celebrations and funerals. In the fall of 1983, weekly anti-Marcos demonstrations began to give the first push to the regime. By the fall of 1985, the regime’s legitimacy had been eroded by the popular protests, leading to the decision to call a new presi-

dential election in 1986. Marcos's fraudulent electoral victory did nothing but exasperate the opposition and, following the elections, Corazon Aquino, widow of the politician assassinated in 1983, announced a campaign of non-violent civil disobedience. Attempted military coups, the continuing demonstrations, the strong support of the Catholic Church for the opposition, and the end of US support finally convinced Marcos to leave.

After the democratic interlude of the 1950s and the installation of an authoritarian monarchy in 1960, opposition mobilization in Nepal intensified in the 1980s, when the Congress Party, the major clandestine organization, allied itself with some Communist groups. The most important demonstrations began in February 1990: a peaceful demonstration of over ten thousand people in Kathmandu, and a general strike that the regime violently suppressed. The demonstrations did not end even when, in April, the king tried to pacify the masses with various promises of reform. A new constitution in 1991 that limited royal powers and provided for free elections seemed to be the turning point for the regime. (The monarchy persisted, however, until declaration of a democratic republic in 2008.)

Fueled by the economic crisis of the 1970s and 80s and the collapse of legitimacy of internal power, other forms of prolonged mass mobilization were seen in Latin America (for example, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay) and in East Central Europe (especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, and the Baltic countries). Among the Communist regimes, the most interesting case was that of Czechoslovakia, where the old elite, led by Gustáv Husák, seemed totally impervious to calls for moderation coming from Moscow and Mikhail Gorbachëv. The revival of civil society and the population's mobilization around two leaders, Havel and Dubček, had a particularly dynamic role in the fall of the regime. Active clandestine political groups were already a reality at the end of 1988. In mid-1989 there were 27 independent political groups and movements and more than 40 *samizdat* periodicals (Grilli di Cortona 1997, 24). Public demonstrations became the only real method of applying pressure for change, and in the second half of 1989 there were three demonstrations in Prague (August 21, October 28 and December 10) in

which thousands participated. The inability of the elites to respond by beginning negotiations with democratic reformers provoked the collapse of the old regime, with Husák's resignation in December 1989, and produced a higher level of participation in the process of change than in countries like Hungary and Poland, where reforms launched by the respective Communist leaderships had allowed them to control the transition's initial phases.

Chile's case is very unusual and its inclusion in cases of civil society mobilization is debatable. In reality, this mobilization was initiated by the authoritarian regime itself, when, in 1980, in an effort to strengthen, re-legitimate, and re-institutionalize the regime, General Pinochet decided to launch a constitutional reform and submit it to a referendum (something similar was also happening in Uruguay), feeling certain of the population's approval. Unlike in the rest of Latin America, where even rightwing movements were aligned against the military (for example, in Uruguay), in Chile the traditional Right and the business world still supported the military (Linz and Stepan 1996, 206). The 1988 referendum was to decide if the person unanimously chosen by the military junta (Pinochet) would govern as an "elected president" for 8 years. This constituted both a way of measuring the level of support for Pinochet and an opportunity to reorganize the opposition. The dictator obtained a modest success (44% of the vote), but not the absolute majority desired. This represented the beginning of the regime's transformation.

Not even Africa was completely immune to pressure from below. The case of South Africa was important, with growing mass mobilization (in addition to other factors, starting with the sanctions and the country's international isolation because of its internal apartheid policies) being decisive in persuading part of the White elite to begin negotiations with the Black opposition. The 1980s were particularly important for popular mobilization against the regime, although such mobilization was already visible in the 1970s. Besides the African National Congress (1912), other organizations were born, including the United Democratic Front (1983) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (1985). 1985-86 and 1989 saw various waves of demonstrations, during which protest spread rapidly and mobilization involved ever more sectors of

society, until de Klerk announced the release of Nelson Mandela, the start of negotiations, and the dismantlement of apartheid.

Sub-Saharan Africa has one of the weakest traditions of civil society among world regions (Leon 2010). One notes limited mobilizations in Benin, the Comoros Islands, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia. The principle protagonists were tribal or ethnic groups, social groups, political parties, unions, churches, and religious groups. Sometimes these mobilizations occurred with the support of parts of the power elites that (via national conferences or referenda) were trying to promote reconstruction of the state, for example in Benin, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Togo, and Zambia at the beginning of the 1990s. As highlighted by Huntington (1991), churches and religious groups were much more active in mass mobilization of civil society during the Third Wave than in previous democratization waves. In particular, alongside other Christian churches, in the 1970s the Catholic Church assumed an increasingly critical position towards authoritarian regimes and played an important role in Poland, Central America, Chile, Brazil, the Philippines, South Korea, East Timor and some African states. In many cases, representatives of local churches took direct initiatives to weaken the existing regimes by convening national conferences (Benin), mediating between the government and opposition (Nicaragua, Poland, Zambia), or applying direct pressure with speeches, pastoral letters and sermons (the Philippines, South Africa). Obviously, internal religious structure is not always decisive. As stated in Joseph (1991) and Carbone (2005, 173) concerning African countries, there also were many cases of failed or interrupted political change (for example, Angola and Burundi) despite strong Catholic majorities.

Elite Internal Dynamics and Crises of Succession

In general, the leadership's internal dynamics are one of the decisive factors in political change. The nature and traits of elites can be very diverse, as are the pacts and coalitions that form the basis of non-democratic regimes. A regime crisis often derives from internal changes in the elite and alliances, which in turn are often the product of economic problems and international crises. These dy-

namics can take three different forms. First, most challenges to the stability of non-democratic regimes come from palace conspiracies and battles within the elite (Frantz and Ezrow 2011). They almost always take the form of a split between hard-liners, who seek to perpetuate the old regime at any cost, and soft-liners (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 15-17) who are prepared to concede some change to respond to the demands of the masses and opposition, but remain firm in their desire to safeguard the regime. Second, for various reasons, individual leaders sometimes decide to initiate change, for example, by launching a more or less wide-reaching democratic transition, which is more or less sincere and genuine. Finally, the decline or even the fall of a regime can be caused by the death of the leader and the resulting succession crisis.

The formation of rifts within the elite is rather common in military regimes, whose origins are often linked with short-term factors and not with long-term ideological projects. In military regimes, the elite is often composed predominantly of members of the armed forces, plus civilian consultants, technocrats, bureaucrats, and representatives of the business and financial world under military influence. In addition, an ideological justification for military regimes is generally nonexistent, replaced by values such as national interest and unity, order, security, fighting corruption, efficiency, and patriotism (Linz and Stepan 1996). Sometimes legitimizing ideological forms are adopted that are clearly specious in nature. The case of Jerry Rawlings is typical. The young Ghanaian officer established a military regime, initially populist and socialist in tone, but then converted to free market policies once he realized that the international order made it worth his while. The objectives of military regimes are often specific, limited in time, and generally have to do with safeguarding the state's integrity from internal threats (guerrillas, rebellions, social disorder, secessions, incompetent politicians, corruption, and illegality) that often come in conjunction with situations of economic crisis, or to defend the military's own corporate interests or those of some particular social group (financial, industrial or agricultural elites). Mostly found in Latin America and Africa, military regimes also have surfaced in Asia (Bangladesh, South Korea, Thailand) as well as in Europe (Greece, Turkey). In Chile under Pinochet and Uganda under Amin, the mil-

itary regimes became personalistic. In such cases, the military tends to lose power to a leader who establishes himself as the *dominus*, even if always with the armed forces' critical support.

As highlighted by many authors (Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996), a peculiarity of praetorian regimes derives from the relative ease with which military regimes can abandon political power and return to the barracks. Nordlinger (1977) observed the tendency of military regimes to last for less time than other kinds of regimes. Authors like Geddes (1999), Hadenius and Teorell (2007), and Kailitz (2013) agreed in finding that military regimes do not last as long as single-party regimes. It is worthwhile to note that officers consider themselves servants of the state, with enduring interests, a permanent role, and high social standing. An evaluation of the costs versus the advantages of remaining in power is often present, and, in any case, given the military's privileged position because of their monopoly on force, a return to power is always possible if any threats should arise to their institutional autonomy. At the same time, one should remember that armed forces are often internally divided, and that these divisions are accentuated in moments of crisis and difficulty, due to policies the armed forces themselves set in motion.

Bolivia's bumpy and irregular journey toward a more democratic order is a crystal clear demonstration of how political change is in many cases determined by the internal dynamics of the elite. Despite factionalism within the armed forces, divided along ideological, generational, and hierarchical lines (Gamarra 1989), the Bolivian military regime lasted for nearly 20 years, until 1982. This long period was characterized by a series of coups and counter-coups, in which 10 military governments of various political orientations, and two weak civilian governments, alternated power. Inside the Bolivian military elite, alliances had to be renegotiated constantly, and the armed forces remained permeable to outside influence, especially from civil sectors, and completely unpredictable in their dealings with other organized groups in society (Whitehead 1986, 54). The Bolivian transition to democracy was therefore tortured and tortuous and finally ended with the military regime's collapse (O'Donnell 1986; Mayorga 2005). The transition began in 1978, but only in 1982 could we speak of actual regime change towards a fragile democracy.

In Brazil, economic crisis accelerated the erosion of the social base supporting the regime (businessmen and the middle classes), altering relations within the elite. The recipe imposed by the International Monetary Fund to deal with the crisis called for cuts in public spending, and consequently in subsidies to private businesses. That alienated the regime's entrepreneurial base, which had provided very extensive, if passive support. Hit hard by the crisis, the middle classes that had been the backbone of the regime during its expansionary phase (1968-1974) were transformed from active supporters to passive dissidents (Martins 1986, 91). In addition, the crisis intensified the rift between hard-liners and soft-liners in the military. Even if the hard-liners threatened another coup d'état to halt the ongoing change, the situation remained within the limits of relative calm, also thanks to a dialog between moderate opposition party leaders and the armed forces. In that sense, Tancredo Neves played a key role when, to obtain the backing of moderate military officers, he promised, in case of an electoral victory, not to support the formation of a constituent assembly independent of the Congress, and accepted the military's demand not to cancel any military decrees (law on national security, anti-strike legislation, press censorship laws, and limitations on Congress) before the promulgation of the new constitution (Fleischer 1998). Intra-elite agreements and alliances were therefore central in the Brazilian transition process (O'Donnell 1986, 12).

In Uruguay, by the time the military took power, the glue that held the military together already had disintegrated. As Linz and Stepan (1996, 153) underline, the guerillas already had been defeated when the military took power in 1973, and by 1980 were no longer a significant presence in the country. In addition, all of the upper classes were convinced that a political opening would contribute to economic recovery, much more than the perpetuation in power of a military class devoid of an economic strategy. Constitutional reform began in 1977, and the subsequent plebiscite of 1980, won by the democratic opposition, further convinced part of the military of the necessity of transferring power to civilians. This deepened the divide between the "military as government," looking for any solution that would guarantee their power, and the "military as an institution," desirous to open contacts with the opposition to orga-

nize a gradual transfer of power that would guarantee the institutional integrity of the armed forces. In Argentina as well, quarrels within the armed forces had an important role, generating internal instability that between 1976 and 1983 saw numerous turnovers at the top of the armed forces (Videla, Viola, Galtieri, and Bignone) culminating in the failed attempt to recover the Falklands and the subsequent collapse of the regime. In Ecuador, the lack of internal cohesion in the armed forces was evident as early as the 1963 coup that put an end to a fragile and unstable democratic phase. New prospects for democratization opened when agreement within the armed forces definitively fell apart. The triumvirate composed of the heads of the three services installed with the January 1976 coup declared its intention to return power to a civilian government.

In the first half of the 1970s in Peru, the high cost of investment, the hike in prices of petroleum and imported technical goods, plus the collapse in the price of exported raw materials, led to a serious trade deficit, financed by enormous foreign bank loans taken out by the military. The explosion of the foreign debt began to undermine the faint prosperity that previous reforms by the military junta had made possible, exacerbating the discontent of both the middle and lower classes, and laying the basis for democratic transition. The economic crisis of the 1970s ended with a worsening contrast within the armed forces, between the radical faction, led by General Velasco Alvarado, and the more moderate faction that favored reforms to encourage both internal and international private investment. Velasco was deposed in 1975, and followed by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez who announced the beginning of a "second phase" of the Peruvian revolution. In any case, military power seemed destined to end, and did end in 1979-80 (Cotler 1986, 156).

In Greece, internal divisions were rooted in the clash between monarchists and republicans within the armed forces, accentuated by the crown's rather tardy opposition to the 1967 coup d'état. In part, this division was at the root both of the failed attempt to form a proper governing coalition and the inability of the Colonels' regime to institutionalize itself despite two new constitutions (1968 and 1973) and a controversial referendum that abolished the monarchy, also in 1973. The student demonstrations in November of the

same year represented yet another challenge to the regime, and led to a coup by hard-liners and the ouster of Papadopoulos by General Dimitrios Ioannidis, after a stand off between different components of the armed forces. This was a prelude to the military adventure in Cyprus that ushered in the end of the military regime.

In Lesotho, internal frictions in the military elite led to the April 1991 coup that was the final push toward a transition. When an elite's homogeneity ends, it is usually due to negative economic events, failure of an "internal enemy" strategy, the effects of international isolation, or erosion of the regime's bases of social support.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, as of 1999, 23 military leaders had been in power for more than 10 years, and 9 for more than 20 (Carbone 2005, 77). It is easy to understand how regime changes have occurred during the tenures of some of those leaders. In Togo, for example, during Colonel Étienne Gnassingbé Eyadéma's long rule, the regime experienced military and civilian phases, attempted coups, popular revolts and faint democratic openings. As repeatedly stated by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Carbone (2005), in Africa the military is central to democratic transition. When they oppose it (Nigeria 1993) it fails. When they are in favor, the transition is launched and has a greater chance for success (Ghana and, once again, Nigeria after 1998).

An interesting question is what induces certain authoritarian leaders to change direction and strive to reform the regime. Despite widespread high levels of unscrupulousness and opportunism, of the "things must change, in order to stay the same" variety, the most common motivations are loss of international support or an attempt to ride the wave of a change that appears to be inevitable, while also looking after their own interests and guaranteeing their personal security and that of their entourage. From this viewpoint, we can ascertain that sometimes it is the new generation of authoritarian leaders that brings about this turn in policy, and other times it is the product of conversions or political recycling fueled more by opportunism than by a sincere desire for reform. Mikhail Gorbachev's decision to reform the Soviet system in the second half of the 1980s was surely the underlying cause of the landslide that rolled over the European Communist world. He did not foresee that this decision would further weaken the Communist empire's

last frail pillars. Even with a long preliminary period of weak attempts at dialog during the 1980s, in 1990 Frederik Willem de Klerk had the courage to begin negotiations with Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress and decreed the end of apartheid, extending rights to the entire non-White population. Although they were prominent representatives respectively of the Soviet leadership and of the White elite in power in South Africa, Gorbachëv and de Klerk belonged to a new generation of leaders that not been governing long and had what it took to launch a reform. This is not always the case. In Burkino Faso, Blaise Campaoré's conversion from military dictator to elected president was astonishing and not very believable. Similar observations can be made for Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, Hastings Banda in Malawi, and for the still unclear democratic transformation/conversion of the Communists in Romania.

Most especially in personal dictatorships, the death of the leader and a succession crisis can represent opportunities for change. Precisely because of this, many autocracies (even very different from one another) have revived (or at least attempted to revive) old hereditary traditions, to guarantee a dynastic succession for a son or at least a trusted member of the dominant clan (Brownlee 2007). There are many examples of this: Nicaragua (1956), Dominican Republic (1960), Haiti (1971), Taiwan (1975), North Korea (1994 and again in 2011-12), Syria (2000), Azerbaijan (2003), Singapore (2004), Togo (2005) (Brownlee 2007, 601). In many other countries the desire to ensure a dynastic succession was equally evident, e.g. for Ceaușescu in Romania and Qaddafi in Libya. The fact remains that the death of a leader always represents a critical moment for the regime. Despite differences in conditions and timing, the deaths of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal (1968), Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan (1975), Francisco Franco in Spain (1975), Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya (1978), Sani Abacha in Nigeria (1998) and Franjo Tuđman in Croatia (1999) accelerated or caused the end of their respective regimes.

The death of a leader becomes a source of change for at least two reasons. The first is that, in any case, it is a change that produces realignments, shifts in alliances, and fear among individuals, structures, groups, bureaucrats, and institutions of losing privileges and income from positions obtained under the previous lead-

ership. Then there is dissatisfaction on the part of those who feel underappreciated by the new leadership. All this can induce the new leader to look for different alliances (perhaps with civil society or opposition groups). The second reason is that, once a new leader is designated, they rarely maintain total continuity with their predecessor. The temptation to somehow differentiate oneself can be very strong, and the designated successor can decide to pursue new policies and radically innovate, as happened in Spain with Juan Carlos, or perhaps less dramatically with Caetano at Salazar's death. Even though the change was barely perceptible and the discontinuities of little importance, even in this second case the prospects for change could make headway within civil society and elite milieus, and prepare the ground for further transformation.

Personal dictatorships have difficulty in envisaging institutionalized procedures for succession. Succession usually comes in one of three ways: 1) the old leader's nomination of a successor while still alive; 2) following a natural course via the predictable accession to power of the leader's deputy or an old collaborator; 3) a power struggle among various personalities, all of whom try to come out on top. Spain and Taiwan provide examples of the first option. The reasoning was different, but the results were similar. Francisco Franco already had designated Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón in the 1960s, but the project of restoring the monarchy at the end of the Franco era dated from many years earlier. Two days after Franco's death on November 22, 1975, Juan Carlos was crowned king of Spain. Despite the fact that this was an agreed and non-traumatic transition, intended to ensure continuity, this new political path's break with the past was evident from the outset. To name only a few of the key changes that confirmed the end of Francoist Spain and the breakthrough of democracy: the Cortes's approval of the *Ley para la Reforma Política* in November 1976; the first post-Franco democratic elections in June 1977, establishing a parliament that de facto became a constituent assembly; and the king's firm stand against the attempted coup in 1981.

In Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded his father Chiang Kai-shek, who died in 1975. He had already held high government positions and had emerged as the designated heir. In this case as well, we are dealing with a transition guided by reformist sectors of the

old leadership that, within a few years, produced clear breaks from the authoritarian regime of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. The 1987 repeal of martial law, in effect since 1949, was among the most incisive actions. The death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 did not lead to any regression towards authoritarianism, and political change set down roots.

In Kenya, we saw the second mode of succession, the rise to power of an old collaborator of the deceased charismatic leader. Under personalistic and charismatic leadership, Jomo Kenyatta ruled uncontested from independence in 1963 until August 1978. He governed via a single party, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) and the predominance of the Kikuyu ethnic group. After Kenyatta's death, power passed to Vice President Daniel arap Moi in October 1978. He distinguished himself from his predecessor via a series of policies, redistributing benefits to the Kalenjin, his own ethnic group, and starting a slow transition, marked by frequent interruptions, violence and regressions, that never accomplished a complete democratization of the country. In Serbia and Croatia, the beginning of democratization was closely linked to the departure of charismatic leaders who seemed to be the main obstacles to political change. While in Serbia Milošević was removed by defeat in the October 2000 elections, in Croatia change followed Tuđman's death. Guided principally by the authoritarian elite, the transition phase was short-lived. It concentrated predominantly on electoral reform, given that the principal democratic institutions already had existed, at least formally, in Tuđman's time. The transition concluded with the first free elections, won by the political parties that had opposed Tuđman.

The third mode, a power struggle after the leader's death, is the most common in Communist regimes. Even if out of context for the Third Wave of democratizations, a classic model is that of the USSR after 1953. With Stalin dead, the proclamation of a collective leadership in reality was camouflage for a power struggle that, in the end, was won by Khrushchev.

Conclusions

Even though the number of countries involved in the Third Wave was undoubtedly high (83), the question at the center of comparative studies is always the same: why have certain autocratic regimes remained stable and have, without any particular damage, survived the innovative push of the Third Wave, while others have collapsed? An important point concerning the countries of the Third Wave is that all kinds of regimes were involved in transformations of the political order. From the quantitative point of view, plebiscitary single-party regimes (40) and military/civilian-military regimes (25) outnumbered the others. To these were added more or less competitive single-party systems, personal tyrannies with sultanistic characteristics, colonial regimes, traditional monarchies, racial oligarchies, and theocracies. Certainly there exist long-term factors, universally valid, that explain the greater or lesser longevity and stability of regimes, as well as incidental causes that help us understand discrepancies and the specificities of individual paths. This question often reoccurs in the literature (for example, recently, Gerschewski 2013). Other authors have asked themselves the same question about democracies (Przeworski et al. 1996). Let's begin with the first part of the question: How do we explain the persistent stability of so many autocracies?

According to Gerschewski (2013), from a solely internal perspective, the pillars of autocratic regimes are legitimization, cooptation, and repression. As we have seen in the preceding pages, in reality the Third Wave needs clear and better developed explanations, such as international causes (both political and economic) and internal factors that intertwine and blend, generating those different and distinct causal concatenations to which we have referred. We once again confirm that it is impossible to construct a general theory, valid *urbi et orbi* for all regime transformations. Exactly like those for the *decline and fall*, the reasons for the *persistence* of regimes vary notably, according to different spatial and temporal logics. The Third Wave is characterized by the end of the Communist regimes, but few take note (among these Saxonberg 2013) of how Communist regimes that are very important on the international chessboard have managed to survive, e.g. in China, North Korea,

Cuba, and Vietnam.³ It is unthinkable to get away with saying that only European Communist regimes fell, but not those outside of Europe, given the fate of Communist regimes in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Grenada, Mongolia, and Nicaragua (Saxonberg 2013).

There is no lack of attempts to explain these differences in persistence/decline. Brown (2009) cites the capacity of some Communist regimes to transform the old ideology and resurrect nationalism, an explanation that does little, however, to explain the results of the Croatian, Serbian, and Romanian transitions. Levitsky and Way's theory (2005; Way and Levitsky 2007) is certainly more developed and convincing. Using the concepts of *Western leverage* and *linkage to the West*, it re-proposes international factors. The first concept describes the degree of each country's penetrability and vulnerability to outside pressure, determined by the subject country's economic and military size and strength, the nature of the West's strategic and economic interests, and the presence or absence of possible alternative pressures. Great powers like Russia and China, and regions like the Middle East, where there is an extensive network of competing international interests, are in the end less pervious to Western pressure for democratization. The concept of *linkage to the West* refers to the strength and depth of a country's ties to the United States, European Union, and other Western-led multilateral institutions. These ties have five dimensions (Levitsky and Way 2005, 22): economic (credit, investment, assistance); geopolitical, such as agreements and alliances with Western organizations and states; social (tourism, immigration, Western education and training of internal elites); communication (Internet, Western media penetration); transnational civil society (religious organizations, NGOs, political party organizations, etc.). The stronger and more rooted the ties, the higher the "costs of authoritarianism," making Western denunciations and condemnations more likely and effective, and increasing the likelihood of protest and dissent within the country involved. This type of theory helps us not only understand the varying results of change (the post-Soviet Asian republics vs. the Baltics, but also Ukraine, torn apart by the pull of the West in its western half and the lure of Russia to the east) but can also explain the persistence of autocratic regimes where Western leverage and linkage to the West are practically nonexistent or of low intensity: China, North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam.

If among the Communist systems we find only a few cases where political regimes resisted the shocks of the Third Wave, countries whose economies are dominated by energy resources are generally much more impervious to change. This kind of economic arrangement almost always ensures a regime's long life and stability. For example, in the case of the "traditional regimes" of the Gulf, petroleum enables elites supported by familial or tribal networks to use "modern" political structures, like public institutions, to reinforce their power without having to change their social contract with the governed. Enormous oil wealth facilitates state centralization and the expansion of the state's role in society. It requires the leadership to spend heavily, maintaining vast client networks to prevent the formation of independent groups in society, thereby inhibiting the growth of opposition movements and dissent. At the same time they must use that mechanism to co-opt social groups that might sooner or later organize an opposition and challenge the regime (Ross 2001). Oil wealth needs a strong authoritarian state, which in turn needs oil. One of the first analyses of the regime born of the 1979 Iranian revolution (Skocpol 1982) revealed how much of the new Islamic Republic's oil income was diverted to bolster the armed forces and internal security.

Are the factors that lead to democratization the same that cause the crisis of the old regimes? Not always. Military elites, for example, might be a factor in the crisis and transition of an autocratic regime, but not necessarily a factor in the consolidation of democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996, 66ff.). Mass mobilizations weaken and destabilize the old regime, and represent an ever more frequent crisis factor, but, if extremist or radical passions triumph over moderation, not only does the road towards democracy become more difficult, but there is a risk of all change stalling. The same is true for economic crises and other causal factors. It is clear that an autocratic regime entering into crisis is a necessary but insufficient step for the realization of a democratization process.

What we aimed to document in this chapter was that, referring to the various processes involved in political change, some prevalent cases can be identified that represent real internal pressures for change. As seen in Table 1, destabilizing legacies from the past, mobilization of the masses and of civil society, and elite internal

dynamics and succession crises constitute the principal internal sources of change, and combine with other factors analyzed in this volume: external pressure and obligations, state-building processes, or at least the reconstruction of state organizations.

It is evident how the development of mass politics during the 20th century explains the growth and frequency of mass mobilizations and the active role of civil society, in contrast to the transitions of the Second Wave (Huntington 1991; Stoner, Diamond, Girod, and McFaul 2013, 15). Irrespective of the end results, about half of the states involved in the transformations of the Third Wave saw the development of protest from below. This was a geographically widespread phenomenon, occurring almost everywhere, even in Africa. Equally strong was the role of the old elites. In a series of countries (Spain, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay, Mongolia, Russia, Slovenia, Hungary, Benin, Burkina Faso) the old elites took the initiative for change. In others, the conversion to change was the product of pressure from below or outside, but in the end the elite went along with the regime's transformation, perhaps *obtorto collo*. This proves the importance of pacts, crucial for understanding the transitions in Southern Europe, Latin America, East Central Europe (the "round tables"), South Africa, and other African cases.

Endnotes

¹The fate of dictators depends on both the outgoing regime, since military leaders have a greater probability of being arrested than heads of single-party regimes, and the incoming regime. In democratizations, for example, exemplary punishment of dictators is less likely (Escribà-Folch 2013).

²Here we mean mistakes by democratic political forces as well as the democratic regime's institutional structure that contributed to the crisis and fall of democracy. See Linz (1978).

³Lambie (1999) provides an unusual, and rather debatable, explanation of the Cuban case.

Table 1. Internal Causes of Regime Crisis in States Involved in the Third Wave

	AFRICA	LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN	ASIA	EASTERN/CENTRAL EUROPE	SOUTHERN EUROPE
Importance of legacy	Botswana, Ghana, Senegal	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay	South Korea, Turkey	Czechoslovakia, DDR, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia	Greece, Spain, Portugal
Role of elites or individual leaders more or less favorable to change	Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Niger, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda		Indonesia, Mongolia, Taiwan, Thailand, Western Samoa	Bulgaria, Hungary, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia	Spain
Succession crises with conflicts and divisions within the civilian and military elites	Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay	Taiwan	Croatia, Serbia	Portugal, Spain
Mobilization of civil society and demands from below	Benin, Comoros Islands, Lesotho, Malawi, Niger, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia	Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay	East Timor, Indonesia, Mongolia, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand	Croatia, Czech Republic, DDR, Estonia, Georgia, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, Ukraine	Greece, Portugal

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